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COMMENTS 
WHY CAN’T WE BE FRIENDS?  THE 
BANNING OF TEACHER-STUDENT 
COMMUNICATION VIA SOCIAL MEDIA 
AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
GIULIA M. DI MARZO∗ 
Undoubtedly, the sexual abuse of children by authority figures, particularly teachers 
and coaches, has been an issue of national concern for years.  Recently, there have 
been several high-profile child sexual abuse scandals in the news, such as the ordeal 
involving Jerry Sandusky, a former Pennsylvania State University football coach, who 
was convicted of forty-five child sexual abuse counts for sexually abusing ten male 
children over the course of fifteen years.  In an effort to prevent these tragic occurrences, 
state and school district officials have targeted social media as the culprit. 
As states and school districts across the nation revisit or implement social-media 
policies, some take the extreme action of completely banning teachers from using social 
media to communicate with students.  In addition to disadvantaging students in an 
                                                 
 ∗ Note & Comment Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 62; J.D. 
Candidate, May 2013, American University, Washington College of Law; B.A. 
Communication, 2009, University of Maryland.  Many thanks to Professor Daniel 
Marcus, whose guidance and feedback greatly improved this Comment, and 
Professor Ira P. Robbins, for his constant support and encouragement.  A special 
thank you to my editor during the Comment process, Ben Horowitz, for his fantastic 
input and advice.  I would also like to thank the American University Law Review staff, 
particularly Tracey F. Little, Joseph W. Gross, Kathleen Scott, Allison M. Vissichelli, 
Jay Curran, Andrew M. Concannon, Evan M. Harris, Kira Hettinger, and Adelia M. 
Hunt, for their significant effort in preparing this Comment for publication.  Finally, 
I am immensely grateful for the continued unconditional love and support of my 
parents and my sister Marina.  This Comment is dedicated to my Nonno Guido—tu 
si nu piezz’ e core. 
DI MARZO.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2012  12:56 PM 
124 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:123 
 
electronic era, these bans are unconstitutional, running afoul of the First Amendment, 
because they are overbroad and do not pass intermediate scrutiny. 
Although states and school districts have substantial leeway in disciplining their 
employees for online expressions, they cannot implement laws or policies that infringe 
upon employees’ expression that is constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.  
States and school districts are continuously battling with the issue of how to regulate 
social-media use by teachers and need guidance in crafting policies.  This Comment 
analyzes current laws and policies that are likely to be found unconstitutional by 
courts; this Comment also provides social-media policy guidelines that, in contrast, are 
likely to survive constitutional challenge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Amy Hestir was twelve years old, she was sexually abused by 
one of her male teachers.1  This abuse lasted nearly a year.2  Over 
thirty years later, in March of 2011, Hestir recounted her traumatic 
story to the Missouri General Assembly in order to galvanize support 
for legislation banning teacher-student communication via any 
exclusive electronic media, such as social-networking websites.3  The 
law also contained various other provisions designed to curtail child 
sexual abuse by teachers.4 
In her testimony before the Missouri House Education Committee, 
Hestir depicted how her abuser psychologically controlled her 
through the use of threats and a pornographic novel that featured a 
main character named “Amy.”5  She also described when the abuse 
would occur:  during her teacher’s planning hour, during the time 
when her teacher would take her home after she babysat for his 
daughter, and during the summer when she would meet him at 
church.6  At the time, Hestir did not divulge the matter to any adults 
because of the shame and fear she felt, but after nine years of silence, 
she gathered the courage to report the incident and open an 
investigation.7  Unfortunately, the investigation did not produce 
                                                 
 1. Sydney Muray, A Close Look at Missouri’s “Amy Hestir Student Protection Act,” ERIC 
GOLDMAN:  TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 16, 2011, 4:11 PM), http://blog.eric 
goldman.org/archives/2011/08/a_close_look_at.htm. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.; see also S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 162.069 (Mo. 2011) 
(repealed 2011).  For the purpose of this Comment, exclusive electronic media 
refers to the ability of teachers to directly and privately contact students via electronic 
media.  I refer to all forms of Internet publications, as well as text messaging and e-
mail, as electronic media.  I consider social media, also known as social-networking 
websites, a subset of electronic media, referring specifically to websites that enable 
people to communicate via the Internet in order to share information and resources.  
The term “social media” includes audio, video, images, podcasts, and other 
multimedia communications. 
 4. Mo. S.B. 54 § 162.069; see also Allison Blood, Legislature To Take Up ‘Facebook 
Bill’ in Special Session, MISSOURINET (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.missourinet.com/ 
2011/08/26/legislature-to-take-up-facebook-bill-in-special-session/ (detailing the 
mandates of the Amy Hestir Act, such as requiring background checks of teachers, 
requiring suspension of teachers verified to have engaged in sexual misconduct, and 
prohibiting registered sex offenders from participation on school boards). 
 5. Missouri:  Amy Hestir Davis Student Protection Act—Student Abused by a Jr. High 
School Teacher, SEXLAWS.ORG, http://www.sexlaws.org/amy_hestir_davis_student_ 
protection_act (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Missouri:  Amy Hestir Davis 
Student Protection Act]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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results, and Hestir’s abuser continued his career in teaching by 
transferring to a different school district.8 
Accounts of abuse such as this one are not anomalies; many 
students around the nation share similar stories.  In fact, Missouri, 
the state where Hestir was abused, is ranked only eleventh in the 
nation for the number of educators who have lost their licenses due 
to sexual misconduct.9  States have addressed this issue in various 
ways.  Even though social-networking sites were not yet conceived of 
when Amy Hestir was in school and sexual abuse by teachers was 
documented as early as 430 B.C.,10 the Missouri General Assembly 
believed that banning teacher-student communication via electronic 
media would prevent sexual abuse.11 
The Missouri General Assembly passed the bill, with Governor Jay 
Nixon signing it into law on July 14, 2011.12  The new law, named the 
“Amy Hestir Student Protection Act,” was scheduled to go into effect 
on August 28, 2011.13  The Missouri State Teachers Association, 
however, opposed the law and quickly sprung into action, filing a 
                                                 
 8. Id.; accord Muray, supra note 1 (terming the act of transferring teachers who 
engage in sexual misconduct from district to district “passing the trash”); see also 
Conor Friedersdorf, Let Teachers and Students Be Facebook Friends, ATLANTIC (Aug. 9, 
2011, 10:40 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/08/let-
teachers-and-students-be-facebook-friends/243324 (revealing that while Amy Hestir 
reported the crime within the statute of limitations, police declined to file charges). 
 9. See Missouri:  Amy Hestir Davis Student Protection Act, supra note 5 (citing a 
congressional investigation that uncovered that approximately one in ten U.S. 
students has been sexually abused during the student’s primary education by a 
school employee). 
 10. See THORKIL VANGGAARD, PHALLOS:  A SYMBOL AND ITS HISTORY IN THE MALE 
WORLD 87 (1972) (“Paiderasty served the highest goal—education (paideia).  Eros 
was the medium of paideia, uniting tutor and pupil.  The boy submitted and let 
himself be taken in the possession of the man.”); see also Hein van Dolen, Greek 
Homosexuality, LIVIUS, http://www.livius.org/ho-hz/homosexuality/homosexuality. 
html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (recounting a story describing Socrates as “boy 
crazy” and how Socrates would lose his senses around the beautiful boys to whom he 
taught philosophy). 
 11. Editorial, States Miss a Social-Media Education Opportunity, WASH. POST (Aug. 
19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/states-miss-a-social-media- 
education-opportunity/2011/08/16/gIQATbqlQJ_story.html; accord Kashmir Hill, 
Why Missouri’s Ban on Teacher-Student Facebook Friendships Is Doomed, FORBES (Aug. 8, 
2011, 1:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/08/08/why- 
missouris-ban-on-teacher-student-facebook-friendships-is-doomed/ (stating that the 
purpose of the Hestir Act is to curtail improper sexual conduct between teachers and 
students). 
 12. Michael Ruff, SB 54—Creates the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act and Establishes 
the Task Force on the Prevention of Sexual Abuse of Children, MO. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.mo.gov/11info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=4066
479 (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
 13. Id. 
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complaint against Governor Nixon for injunctive relief.14  A Missouri 
trial court granted the injunction on August 26, 2011, finding “that 
the statute would have a chilling effect on speech.”15  The court also 
noted that “[e]ven if a complete ban on certain forms of 
communication between certain individuals could be construed as 
content neutral and only a reasonable restriction on ‘time, place and 
manner,’ the breadth of the prohibition is staggering.”16  Shortly after 
the court granted the injunction, the Missouri Senate repealed the 
ban by passing a narrower version of the law that delegated to school 
districts the authority to draft their own social-media policy.17 
Missouri is not the only state where policymakers have taken 
measures to contend with concerns about the increase in social-
media use and communication by and among teachers and students 
and the potential abuse associated with such use and 
communication.18  For example, in 2009, the Louisiana Legislature 
passed a law categorically banning teacher-student communication 
via social-networking sites.19  This law has yet to be challenged on 
                                                 
 14. See Petition for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment, Mo. State 
Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 4425537, at *1 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 
Sept. 23, 2011), available at http://www.msta.org/news/Petition_final.pdf (outlining 
the Missouri State Teachers Association’s First Amendment free speech challenge to 
the ban). 
 15. Mo. State Teachers Ass’n, 2011 WL 4425537. 
 16. Id. 
 17. S.B. 1, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Extra. Sess. § 162.069 (Mo. 2011). 
 18. See, e.g., Frank LoMonte, Louisiana Joins “Technophobia” Craze with Restraints on 
Teacher-Student Communications, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2009), 
http://www.splc.org/wordpress/?p=308 (describing Louisiana’s social-media 
regulation that attempts to prevent inappropriate relationships between teachers and 
students); Ohio District Limits Teachers’ Use of Social Media, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. 
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ohio-district-limits-teachers’-
use-of-social-media (discussing the policy of Dayton Public Schools, one of Ohio’s 
largest school districts, that prohibits teachers from being friends with students on 
Facebook and other social-networking sites as well as “responding to students’ 
attempts at communicating through any personal or professional accounts not 
approved by the district”); Should Teachers ‘Friend’ Students on Facebook?, ALTA. SCH. 
BDS. ASS’N:  VIS-À-VIS LEGAL COMMENT. (Sept. 2010), https://www.asba.ab.ca/ 
natlegalnews/sept10/files/hr_corner.html (recognizing that Lee County may be the 
first school district in Florida to implement regulations banning all teacher-student 
communication via social-networking sites); Audrey Watters, Virginia Poised To Ban 
Teacher-Student Texting, Facebooking, READWRITEWEB (Jan. 9, 2011), 
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/virginia_poised_to_ban_teacher-student_ 
texting_fac.php (outlining the Virginia Public Schools’ “model policy” that prohibits 
teachers from using any electronic communications to contact students outside those 
provided by the schools). 
 19. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:81(Q)(2)(b) (2009).  The legislation passed in 
Louisiana mirrors the social-media policies of other school districts and states.  See, 
e.g., DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS POLICY MANUAL:  ACCEPTABLE USE 
AND INTERNET SAFETY FOR INFORMATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY (2012), 
available at http://www.nctq.org/docs/Dayton_Policy_Manual-Aug_2012.pdf. 
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constitutional grounds.  Nevertheless, the question of whether 
schools can discipline public school teachers for their use of social 
media has not been free from judicial scrutiny, as lower courts in 
other states have adjudicated cases concerning the termination of 
public school teachers for inappropriately communicating with 
students via social-networking sites.20  The analysis concerning state or 
school district categorical bans, however, does not center solely on a 
case-by-case determination of whether a particular teacher’s speech is 
inappropriate and consequently unprotected by the First 
Amendment.  Rather, the analysis focuses on whether such 
categorical bans, taken as a whole, are facially permissible under First 
Amendment doctrines.21 
This Comment argues that state and school district regulations 
banning all teacher-student communication via social-networking 
websites, such as Missouri’s and Louisiana’s laws, are unconstitutional 
because they are overbroad and do not survive intermediate scrutiny.  
The bans are also impractical; they only target communication via 
electronic media, while ignoring all other modes of communication 
that can also lead to inappropriate conduct, like hand-written notes 
and in-person communication.  In the process, the bans also restrict 
beneficial uses of electronic media that enhance education in our 
modern world.  This Comment continues by highlighting guidelines 
that do not run afoul of the Constitution, but achieve the same goal 
desired by state and school district administrators, that of curtailing 
inappropriate teacher-student communication. 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of current state 
legislation and school district policies banning teacher-student 
communication via social media and sets forth the two available First 
Amendment challenges and the applicable standards courts should 
use to determine the constitutionality of such bans.  Part I also 
discusses the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
regarding teacher speech and how lower courts have applied the 
Court’s framework specifically to analyze out-of-school teacher-
                                                 
 20. See, e.g., Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008) (finding that a drunken-pirate photo and comments made by 
a public school teacher about other faculty were not a matter of public concern and 
therefore were not protected speech); Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 
(D. Conn. 2008) (upholding the school board’s decision not to renew a teacher’s 
employment contract following the discovery of inappropriate communication with 
students through his MySpace page). 
 21. See Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *16 (holding that the First Amendment did 
not protect a teacher’s online postings not because they were inappropriate, but 
because they did not touch on a matter of public concern). 
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student communication via social-networking sites.  Part II argues 
that laws banning all teacher-student communication via electronic 
media are facially unconstitutional because they are overbroad and 
not sufficiently precise.  Part II further argues that even if such bans 
survive an overbreadth challenge, they would not pass constitutional 
muster under the applicable standard of intermediate scrutiny.  
Finally, Part III proposes alternative guidelines that would regulate 
teacher-student communication via social-networking sites without 
violating the First Amendment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Current Regulations Banning Teacher-Student Communication via 
Electronic Media 
In an era of highly-publicized child sex abuse scandals,22 state and 
school administrations are frantically grappling for solutions to 
protect students from inappropriate interactions with teachers.23  In 
their attempt to eliminate such interactions, lawmakers and 
policymakers across the country are focusing their attention on the 
role that social media plays in facilitating communications between 
teachers and students due to the potential for abuse inherent in these 
communication media.24  Several states and public school districts 
                                                 
 22. See, e.g., Mo. State Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 
4425537 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011) (discussing a ban on student-teacher 
communication via social-media sites that resulted from what became a highly 
publicized sexual abuse case, Amy Hestir’s case); Inside the Penn State Scandal, WASH. 
POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/sports/case-against-sandusky 
/?hpid=z3 (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (summarizing the incidents of sexual abuse 
that Jerry Sandusky, former Pennsylvania State University football coach, committed 
against male children spanning from 1994 to 2009); Sheriff:  Shop Teacher Paid Teen 
Girl for Explicit Cell Pics of Herself, KATU.COM (Aug. 17, 2012, 5:38 PM), 
http://www.katu.com/news/local/166580236.html (discussing the allegations 
against a shop teacher for paying a young girl money to send explicit picture and 
video texts via cell phone); Texas Teacher of the Year Accused of ‘Sexting’ with Teenage 
Student, FOXNEWS.COM (June 1, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/06/01/ 
texas-teacher-year-accused-exting-with-teenage-student/ (explaining that John 
McDaniel used text messages and the Internet to solicit and receive inappropriate 
photographs of one of his fifteen-year-old students). 
 23. Sara Pauff & Sonya Sorich, Muscogee County Schools New Social Media Policy 
Discourages ‘Friending,’ Texting Between Teachers, Students, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2012), 
http://www.macon.com/2012/01/14/1862833/muscogee-county-schools-new-
social.html; Schools Tackle Rules for Social Media, WANE.COM (Jan. 15, 2012, 11:54 AM), 
http://www.wane.com/dpp/news/education/schools-tackle-rules-for-social-media. 
 24. See Mikel J. Sporer, Social Media Laws Aim To Curb Bullying and Abuse of 
Children Online, SILHA BULL., Fall 2011, 27, at 27, available at 
http://www.silha.umn.edu/assets/doc/FallB2011printing.pdf (commenting that 
states responded to teachers’ potential abuse of social-media sites by passing 
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have recently revamped or implemented regulations and policies 
restricting or banning teacher-student communication via electronic 
means, including social-networking sites.25  Other states plan to revisit 
their current social-media regulations to prohibit the abuse of social-
media sites.26  Surprisingly, the Missouri ban has been the only social-
media ban to date that teachers have challenged on constitutional 
grounds.27 
Prior to being repealed, Missouri’s law banning teacher-student 
exclusive electronic communication stated that “[n]o teachers shall 
establish, maintain, or use a work-related [I]nternet site unless such 
site is available to school administrators and the child’s legal 
custodian, physical custodian, or legal guardian.” 28  Under the law, 
teachers also could not have a non-work-related website that allows 
exclusive communication with a student or a former student.29  The 
language of the Missouri law could have been interpreted as 
extending the ban to all teacher-student communication via 
electronic media, including educational websites and services like 
Blackboard and Edmodo.30  Additionally, the law treated exclusive 
                                                 
legislation aimed at limiting student-teacher communication via social media); Rules 
To Limit How Teachers and Students Interact Online, TCHR. WORLD (Dec. 20, 2011), 
http://www.teacher-world.com/teacher-blog/?tag=social-media-policies (reacting to 
policies implemented after a minority of teachers misused social-media sites in 
communicating with their students). 
 25. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:81(Q)(2)(b) (2009) (proscribing the use of 
electronic modes of communication that are not specifically made available by the 
school); DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., supra note 19 (prohibiting teachers from friending, 
messaging, or texting students, or from responding to students’ messages on social-
media sites); see also Rules to Limit How Teachers and Students Interact Online, supra note 
24 (detailing the Statesboro, Georgia Public School policy that prohibits text 
messages and all other private electronic communications between teachers and 
students). 
 26. See Jennifer Preston, Rules To Stop Pupil and Teacher from Getting Too Social 
Online, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at A1 (stating that the school boards in California, 
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia plan to revise their social-media policies in the fall 
of 2012). 
 27. See LoMonte, supra note 18 (noting that Louisiana’s law has yet to be 
challenged and asserting that if it were, it would not survive). 
 28. S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 162.069 (Mo. 2011) (repealed 2011). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Muray, supra note 1 (observing that the way the bill defines “exclusive 
access” —mutual consent by both teacher and student to have access to 
information—makes the scope of the bill extremely broad).  Blackboard is an 
educational interactive platform that allows teachers to communicate with students 
and employs different technological tools to reach out to and engage students.  About 
Bb, BLACKBOARD, http://www.blackboard.com/About-Bb/Overview.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2012).  Edmodo is a social-networking website specifically designed for 
teachers and their students that allows teachers to create an online community for 
their classrooms.  EDMODO, http://about.edmodo.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).  
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teacher-student communication in drastically different ways 
depending on the medium; the law categorically prohibited private 
communication through the Internet, but only mandated that 
districts create a policy to address all other avenues of 
communication.31 
After the Missouri court temporarily enjoined the law, the Missouri 
Senate repealed the law by passing a new bill.32  The new law requires 
that school districts formulate their own social-media policy “to 
prevent improper communications between staff members and 
students.”33  Certain Missouri Representatives questioned the new bill 
because it does not detail what a policy should contain and does not 
assist school districts in drafting a policy that will pass constitutional 
muster.34 
 Although Missouri repealed its original ban, Missouri’s new law 
leaves the door open for Missouri school districts to pass overly 
restrictive bans, just like other states and school districts have 
passed.35  For example, Louisiana’s ban requires that school-related 
electronic communication between teachers and students must take 
place via a means “provided by or . . . made available by the school 
system” for this purpose; electronic communication between teachers 
and students for purposes not related to educational service is 
prohibited.36  Following suit, in Ohio, the Dayton Public School 
District implemented a comparable policy stating, “[D]istrict 
employees shall not ‘friend’ current students on social networking 
sites such as Facebook and MySpace . . . .  [D]istrict employees will 
not ‘instant message’ or text message current students, and will not 
respond to student-initiated attempts at conversation through non-
district-approved media, whether personal or professional 
accounts.”37 
                                                 
There are several educational benefits associated with the use of these educational 
websites in schools.  For example, they make instructors more accessible, enable 
student-centered teaching approaches, accommodate different learning styles, 
provide continual access to course material, and add pedagogical benefits.  
Educational Benefits of Online Learning, BLACKBOARD, http://blackboardsupport. 
calpoly.edu/content/faculty/handouts/Ben_Online.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
 31. Mo. S.B. 54 § 162.069. 
 32. S.B. 1, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Extra. Sess. § 162.069 (Mo. 2011) (repealing 
Mo. S.B. 54 § 162.069). 
 33. Mo. S.B. 1 § 162.069. 
 34. See Sporer, supra note 24 (providing one representative’s objection that some 
of the 529 school districts will adopt unconstitutional policies). 
 35. See supra note 18 (listing examples of restrictive social-media regulations). 
 36. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:81(Q)(2)(b) (2009). 
 37. DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., supra note 19. 
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All of these regulations prohibit teachers from communicating 
with students via electronic media simply because these media allow 
exclusive interaction.38  Some, if not all, of the regulations can be 
interpreted as extending the ban to all electronic media, regardless 
of its function, both inside and outside of school.39  By attempting to 
curtail inappropriate interaction between teachers and students 
through social-media bans—which discriminatorily stymie exclusive 
electronic communication while ignoring other methods of exclusive 
communication—volumes of appropriate and beneficial speech are 
muffled.40 
B. The Supreme Court’s First Amendment Free Speech Jurisprudence 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects from 
government interference the rights to freedom of speech and 
freedom of expression.41  Beginning with Gitlow v. New York,42 the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment43 as applying the First Amendment to state 
and local governments.44  Freedom of speech is not an absolute right, 
however, and the Supreme Court deems certain categories of speech, 
                                                 
 38. See Anita Ramasastry, Can Teachers and Their Students Be Banned from Becoming 
Facebook Friends?, VERDICT (Sept. 13, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/09/13/ 
can-teachers-and-their-students-be-banned-from-becoming-facebook-friends 
(defining exclusive interaction as “a private, one-on-one means of communication”).  
Senator Cunningham, in support of the Missouri law, stated that “[e]xclusive 
communication is a pathway into the sexual misconduct.”  Oscar Michelen, Missouri 
Ban on Student-Teacher Facebook Connection Will Not Survive First Amendment Challenge, 
COURTROOM STRATEGY (Aug. 3, 2011, 11:48 PM), http://www.courtroomstrategy.com 
/2011/08/missouri-ban-on-student-teacher-facebook-connection-will-not-survive-first-
amendment-challenge. 
 39. See David A. Lieb, Mo. Repeals Teacher-Student ‘Facebook’ Ban, NBCNEWS.COM 
(Oct. 21, 2011, 5:54 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44994464/ns/technology 
_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/mo-repeals-teacher-student-facebook-ban 
(providing an account of one teacher’s concern for how the law could be interpreted 
to ban the use of editing software for the school’s yearbooks because it has an 
instant-message type feature); Muray, supra note 1 (explaining that the language in 
Missouri’s Amy Hestir Student Protection Act may be so broad that it has the 
“unintended consequence” of banning teachers from simply having accounts on 
social-networking sites also used by students). 
 40. See infra notes 179–218 and accompanying text (applying the Pickering and 
Connick analyses to teacher speech to demonstrate examples of speech via social 
media that are protected by the First Amendment). 
 41. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 42. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 43. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”). 
 44. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. 
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such as fighting words,45 criminal speech,46 and obscenity,47 
unprotected by the First Amendment.48 
When challenging the constitutionality of laws allegedly infringing 
upon First Amendment free speech rights, two general facial 
challenges are available:  overbreadth and failing to satisfy the 
applicable standard of judicial scrutiny.49  A challenger who employs 
the overbreadth doctrine to challenge a law as facially invalid under 
the First Amendment would argue that the law extends too far by 
infringing upon constitutionally protected speech.50  The overbreadth 
doctrine, however, is seldom applicable or successful.51  Alternatively, 
a challenger who attacks a law as facially unconstitutional under the 
applicable standard of judicial scrutiny would argue that the state’s 
legitimate interest is outweighed by First Amendment values.52 
1. The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine 
Although a First Amendment challenge is usually raised regarding 
the application of a law to a particular individual—referred to as an 
as-applied challenge—a challenger can also directly challenge a law 
that regulates speech, as a whole, contending that the law is facially 
                                                 
 45. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (creating the 
fighting words exception to the First Amendment protections of free speech with the 
test for such words being “what men of common intelligence would understand 
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight”). 
 46. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (defining 
criminal speech as “speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation 
of a valid criminal statute”). 
 47. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) 
(holding “Dial-a-porn” to be obscene and not protected by the First Amendment). 
 48. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666 (articulating that it has been long established that 
the freedom of speech granted by the First Amendment does not accord an absolute 
right to speak or an unrestrained authority that protects all uses of language and 
prohibits the punishment of a person who abuses the freedom). 
 49. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 49–50 (2d ed. 2003); see Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 937 (2011) 
(describing the possible facial challenges under the First Amendment Free Speech 
Clause). 
 50. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (outlining the 
appellants’ argument that the law was overbroad because it prohibited allegedly 
protected activities). 
 51. Infra Part I.B.1; see also The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 276, 385, 390–91 (2008) (reporting that an overbreadth challenge is 
practically impossible to succeed on for a criminal defendant who cannot win an as-
applied challenge, but that in the past thirty years civil litigants have had success 
employing the overbreadth doctrine). 
 52. See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (applying the strict 
standard of judicial scrutiny to invalidate a law regulating speech, specifically the 
regulation of picketing based on its subject matter, as facially unconstitutional). 
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unconstitutional because it is overbroad.53  Overbreadth is a powerful 
doctrine54 that a challenger can use to challenge any governmental 
regulation restricting speech even if the regulation could 
constitutionally apply to the specific speech of the challenger.55  A law 
is unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially more 
speech than the First Amendment allows.56  A challenger can 
demonstrate that a law is overbroad by showing a significant number 
of situations where a law could be applied unconstitutionally.57  The 
overbreadth doctrine uniquely permits an individual, whose speech is 
unprotected by the First Amendment and who could constitutionally 
be punished under a more narrow statute, to argue that the law is 
unconstitutional because of how it might be applied to third parties 
not before the court.58  The fundamental concern of the doctrine is 
that overbroad laws will significantly chill constitutionally protected 
speech,59 usually as a result of imprecise and imprudent legislative 
drafting.60 
                                                 
 53. See Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and 
Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 40 (2003) (“[T]he law of 
overbreadth forbids legislatures to draft laws so broadly that they also prohibit, or 
could prohibit, substantial amounts of constitutionally protected expression.”); see 
also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 430 (2009) (explaining the differences 
between the overbreadth doctrine and a traditional as-applied challenge). 
 54. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982) (noting that although the 
doctrine is to be carefully applied, its effects are wide reaching, making it a “strong 
medicine”). 
 55. See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (allowing appellants to challenge the law 
even though the state could constitutionally regulate the particular conduct of the 
appellants). 
 56. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963) (“The objectionable 
quality of . . . overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a 
criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but upon 
the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of 
a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.”). 
 57. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (emphasizing that 
under the overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid only if it bans a substantial 
amount of protected speech both in an absolute sense and relative to the speech 
within the scope of the statute that is legitimately regulated). 
 58. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (observing that the Court 
has repeatedly allowed overbreadth challenges without requiring the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that his conduct was constitutionally permissible under a valid statute). 
 59. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989) (plurality opinion); Ferber, 
458 U.S. at 772; JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 46 
(4th ed. 2008). 
 60. See Chen, supra note 53, at 31 (“[The doctrine] is designed to ensure that 
lawmakers regulate speech-related activities with great precision . . . .  [T]his 
precision requirement can serve as a useful tool to test the legitimacy of lawmakers’ 
motives; the closer the fit between the government’s chosen means and its valid 
objectives, the more likely it is that lawmakers truly sought to fulfill those 
objectives.”). 
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The Supreme Court formulated the current overbreadth doctrine 
in Broadrick v. Oklahoma.61  In Broadrick, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a statute that prohibited state employees from 
engaging in partisan political activities.62  The Court explained that 
for an overbreadth argument to succeed in invalidating a statute 
primarily regulating conduct, the overbreadth of a statue must be 
real and substantial, which is judged in relation to the amount of 
speech and conduct that the statute legitimately restricts.63  Although 
the statute in Broadrick was theoretically capable of stifling protected 
speech, such as political buttons and bumper stickers, it was not 
overbroad because it did not apply with certainty to a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected expression.64  Nevertheless, the 
Court emphasized the legitimacy of the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine by recognizing that “statutes attempting to 
restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be 
narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that 
a particular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling 
needs of society.”65 
While the Broadrick decision was limited to regulations of expressive 
conduct,66 the Court also applies the overbreadth doctrine to 
regulations of pure speech.67  For example, in New York v. Ferber,68 the 
Court employed the overbreadth doctrine but ultimately upheld the 
statute prohibiting the intentional distribution of child 
pornography.69  The Court reasoned that the statute was not 
substantially overbroad because the impermissible applications of the 
statute arguably amounted only to a minute fraction of the speech 
                                                 
 61. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
 62. Id. at 610. 
 63. Id. at 615. 
 64. See id. at 609–10, 615, 618 (upholding the constitutionality of the statute 
because the appellants were unable to demonstrate that the statute prohibited 
protected conduct and that the protected conduct would be chilled by the statute). 
 65. Id. at 611–12. 
 66. Expressive conduct is action by a person that also communicates, or 
expresses, a point or ideology.  See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) 
(holding that burning an American flag is expressive conduct). 
 67. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771–72 (1982) (examining the 
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the intentional distribution of child 
pornography under the overbreadth doctrine).  “Pure speech” is verbal 
communication or vocal discussion, as opposed to expressive conduct.  See Broadrick, 
413 U.S. at 615 (juxtaposing “pure speech” against expressive conduct). 
 68. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 69. Id. at 749, 773. 
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within its scope.70  Further, because such a law did not infringe upon 
a substantial amount of protected speech, a court could remedy any 
resulting overbreadth through a case-by-case analysis of the 
circumstances to which the law allegedly impermissibly applied.71 
The degree to which the legislation targets the social problem 
largely contributes to its permissibility.  Again, in Members of the City 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,72 the Court upheld an ordinance that 
prohibited the posting of signs on public property.73  The Court 
found that the ordinance was not overbroad because it did not 
hinder any more speech than was necessary to accomplish the state’s 
interest in eliminating visual clutter and promoting safety.74  After 
determining that a large percentage of the signs posted in violation 
of the ordinance caused tangible safety and traffic issues, the Court 
rejected the overbreadth challenge because “[b]y banning [the] 
signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil 
it sought to remedy.”75 
The Court has also invalidated laws under the overbreadth 
doctrine.  In City of Houston v. Hill,76 for example, the Court used the 
overbreadth doctrine to invalidate a municipal ordinance that made 
it unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the performance of his 
duties.77  The Court asserted that when confronted with a facial 
overbreadth challenge to a regulation of speech, a court must first 
determine whether a “substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct” is within the reach of the regulation.78  
Employing this analysis, the Court found that the ordinance 
                                                 
 70. Id. at 773 (finding that it was unlikely that the statute reached protected 
expression, such as medical textbooks, because it is not often, if ever, necessary to 
utilize children to produce medical or educational material in the manner that the 
statute prohibited). 
 71. Id. at 773–74 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615–16). 
 72. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
 73. Id. at 791, 810. 
 74. Id. at 810. 
 75. Id. at 802, 808.  In contrast, an ordinance that prohibits all hand-billing on 
public streets is overbroad and thus invalid because the state’s interest in curtailing 
littering could be achieved without abridging protected speech simply by punishing 
littering.  Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).  Compare Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685 (1992) (upholding a more 
narrowly drawn regulation designed to prevent solicitation at airports against First 
Amendment challenges, although restrictions on distribution of publications were 
invalidated), with Bd. of Airport Comm’rs. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 570–
71, 577 (1987) (invalidating a regulation prohibiting First Amendment activities 
within a terminal area of Los Angeles International Airport). 
 76. 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
 77. Id. at 453, 467. 
 78. Id. at 458. 
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criminalized a substantial amount of protected speech because, 
although the ordinance prohibited obscene language, it also 
prohibited all speech that could have been construed as interrupting 
an officer.79  Additionally, the ordinance had the effect of making 
only speech, particularly protected speech, unlawful because the 
State Penal Code already expressly prohibited the targeted conduct 
such as assault.80  Thus, the ordinance was not sufficiently precise to 
prohibit only disorderly conduct or unprotected, obscene language.81  
Consequently, precedent disfavors those ordinances that infringe, 
even inadvertently, upon constitutionally granted rights, particularly 
the freedom of speech. 
The Court recently applied the overbreadth doctrine in Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition82 and held that two provisions of the federal Child 
Pornography Protection Act of 1996 (CPPA) were facially 
unconstitutional.83  In addition to banning the possession and 
distribution of pornographic material produced using actual 
children, CPPA extended the ban to material not produced using 
actual children.84  Thus, CPPA was overbroad because the child-
protection rationale for the speech restriction did not apply to the 
material produced without the use of actual children.85  Further, 
under CPPA, a person possessing unobjectionable material—
material produced not using actual children—that someone else had 
procured could be prosecuted.86  The Court found that this provision 
did “more than prohibit pandering.” 87  Therefore, the provision was 
overbroad because it prohibited possession of material that could not 
otherwise be proscribed.88  Even though the overbreadth doctrine is 
rarely employed and seldom victorious in comparison to other modes 
                                                 
 79. Id. at 460–62. 
 80. Id. at 460–63. 
 81. Id. at 465. 
 82. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 83. Id. at 258. 
 84. Id. at 249–51. 
 85. See id. at 254 (rejecting the government’s arguments that erotic images using 
virtual children still promoted the trafficking of works featuring real children). 
 86. See id. at 257–58 (noting that under this understanding, a person could be 
prosecuted for possessing a movie with a suggestive title that the person knew was 
mislabeled). 
 87. Id. at 258. 
 88. Cf. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 303–04 (2008) (distinguishing the 
reach of the statute in Free Speech Coalition from a statute that banned solicitation of 
child pornography and holding that the latter statute was not overbroad because it 
only criminalized unprotected speech—the distribution of real child pornography 
or pornography believed to contain real children). 
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of analysis applied in First Amendment challenges, it is still a 
recognized and viable doctrine.89 
2. Facial challenges of content-neutral regulations under the applicable 
 standard of intermediate scrutiny 
In addition to an overbreadth challenge, government regulations 
of speech can be challenged as facially violative of the First 
Amendment under the traditional standards of judicial scrutiny.90  To 
determine which standard of scrutiny—strict or intermediate—
applies to a particular government regulation regarding speech, the 
Supreme Court distinguishes between content-based and content-
neutral regulations.91  The content distinction originated in Police 
Department v. Mosley,92 where a Chicago ordinance prohibited only 
certain types of picketing by specific groups of individuals while 
exempting others.93  The Court set forth the broad principle that the 
First Amendment prohibits the government from regulating 
                                                 
 89. See Chen, supra note 53, at 41–43 (detailing the need for the overbreadth 
doctrine and the values the Supreme Court seeks to preserve through the use of the 
doctrine). 
 90. The Supreme Court has recognized and applied three standards of judicial 
scrutiny:  strict, intermediate, and rational basis.  Strict scrutiny is the most 
demanding of the three standards; it requires that the challenged regulation be 
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.  ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 289 (3d ed. 2009).  The law will only be upheld if 
the government can prove that it cannot achieve its goal through any less 
discriminatory alternative.  Id. at 719.  Strict scrutiny is generally applied to laws 
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that create 
classifications based on race and national origin or that regulate fundamental rights.  
Id. at 289.  Intermediate scrutiny requires that the law substantially relate to an 
important governmental interest.  Id.  The Court applies intermediate scrutiny to 
laws that create classifications based on gender or discriminate against non-marital 
children.  See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (announcing that 
statutory gender classifications are to be subjected to an intermediate standard of 
review).  The rational basis test is the least demanding level of scrutiny—a law will be 
upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.  CHEMERINSKY, 
supra, at 723.  Rational basis review is applied to all laws that are not subject to strict 
or intermediate scrutiny.  Id.  In the case of regulations placed on First Amendment 
rights, the Supreme Court has either applied strict or intermediate scrutiny because 
freedom of expression is viewed as a fundamental right, but the right is not absolute.  
Id. at 1212. 
 91. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (discussing the 
importance of the distinction in terms of the level of scrutiny used); see also City of 
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying that 
when a regulation is challenged under the First Amendment doctrine, the court 
must first determine whether the regulation is content neutral and then apply the 
appropriate standard of scrutiny). 
 92. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 93. See id. at 94, 100 (finding that Chicago prohibited picketing involving only 
labor disputes on school property to prevent school disruption). 
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expression based on the expression’s message, idea, subject matter, 
or content.94  A content-based law is generally defined as a law that is 
either a subject-matter or viewpoint restriction.95  The Supreme Court 
has reaffirmed on several occasions that the government cannot 
regulate speech based on its content.96  Appropriately, strict scrutiny, 
the most demanding level of scrutiny, applies when analyzing 
content-based regulations of speech.97 
In contrast, a law regulating speech that applies to all speech, 
regardless of the message, is content neutral.98  When a government 
regulation of speech is content neutral, an intermediate standard of 
scrutiny applies.99  The Court has applied various balancing tests 
under the label intermediate scrutiny by weighing the government’s 
interest against the speaker’s interest.100  The Court also factors the 
reasonableness of the time, place, and manner of content-neutral 
restrictions.101  Importantly, the Court has, at times, described this 
standard in the context of regulations of speech in public fora.102  
However, the Court has also applied the standard to content-neutral 
                                                 
 94. Id. at 95. 
 95. Id.  See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 n.1 (1989), for an example of an 
offensive content discrimination—a statute that prohibited actions that “deface, 
damage, or otherwise physically mistreat [the flag].” 
 96. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stating that 
content-based regulations of expression are presumptively violative of the First 
Amendment); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (same). 
 97. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (explaining that 
the Court’s precedent applies the most exacting standard of scrutiny to regulations 
that burden or hinder speech because of its content). 
 98. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (finding that 
a guideline mandating the use of city-provided sound equipment and technicians was 
content neutral); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 
789, 817 (1984) (holding that a ban on the posting of signs on public property was 
content neutral); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385–86 (1968) (concluding 
that a ban on draft card burning was content neutral). 
 99. See, e.g., Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (applying intermediate scrutiny 
to analyze a content-neutral guideline). 
 100. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 189, 190 (1983) (stating that the Supreme Court applies an open-
ended form of balancing, considering if the justification is significantly substantial 
and if the infringement could be lessened, to determine the constitutionality of 
content-neutral regulations of speech). 
 101. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 534 (Supp. 2009); see Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. at 797 (assessing that precedent permits reasonable restrictions on time, 
place, and manner of speech). 
 102. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002) (analyzing the 
applicability of restrictions to a municipal park ordinance requiring individuals to 
obtain a permit before holding large events); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46–47 (1983) (considering the permissibility of 
restrictions to a collective bargaining agreement limiting union access to the 
interschool mail system and teacher mailboxes). 
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regulations of speech on private property.103  Thus, intermediate 
scrutiny applies to content-neutral regulations regardless of the 
location involved. 
In United States v. O’Brien,104 the Court announced the first version 
of its intermediate scrutiny balancing test:  the Court will uphold a 
regulation if (1) the regulation “furthers an important or substantial 
government interest,” (2) the government interest does not suppress 
free expression, and (3) the regulation restricts no more speech than 
necessary to further the government’s interest.105  The law at issue in 
O’Brien prohibited the mutilation or destruction of draft cards and 
was enacted primarily to ensure the proper functioning of the draft 
system.106  Congress, in creating the law, had no other conceivable 
alternative method that would ensure the continued availability of 
the draft cards as precisely and narrowly as the enacted ban.107  The 
Court concluded that the law passed intermediate scrutiny because it 
furthered a valid governmental interest and was narrowly tailored 
seeing as it was limited to the nonexpressive facet of O’Brien’s 
conduct—the burning of his draft card in what he claimed was a 
protest of the war—and prohibited nothing further.108  However, the 
ban on burning draft cards, albeit a content-neutral ban, did not 
regulate time, place, or manner of protected speech.109 
Twenty years later, the Court clarified its test for content-neutral, 
time, place, and manner regulations in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.110 
In Rock Against Racism, the Court considered the constitutionality 
under the First Amendment of a guideline that mandated the use of 
city-provided sound equipment and technicians to regulate the 
volume of performances in New York City’s Central Park.111  New York 
City had received numerous noise complaints from park users and 
residents living in the surrounding neighborhoods.112  After 
                                                 
 103. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (applying 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to an ordinance prohibiting door-to-
door hand-billing). 
 104. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 105. Id. at 377. 
 106. Id. at 378–81.  The regulation was created pursuant to a substantial 
governmental interest.  Id. 
 107. Id. at 381. 
 108. Id. at 381–82. 
 109. The ban regulated only expressive conduct that, even if considered to 
contain a communicative or speech element, was not constitutionally protected 
activity.  Id. at 376. 
 110. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 111. Id. at 787, 790. 
 112. Id. at 785. 
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considering various solutions, the city concluded the most effective 
way to reduce noise without limiting performances was to provide its 
own high-quality sound equipment and experienced sound 
technician.113  The Court found that the city had a legitimate, 
substantial interest in limiting excessive and disruptive noise levels.114  
Additionally, the city narrowly tailored the guideline to achieve its 
significant interest because the guideline did not prohibit any 
expressive activity; the guideline effectively only regulated the volume 
of such expressions.115  Finally, because the guideline did not make 
the forum inaccessible, there remained ample alternatives for 
communication.116 
The Court articulated its current intermediate scrutiny test in 
analyzing Rock Against Racism:  federal and local governments may 
impress “reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of 
protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication 
of the information.’”117  This test modified the O’Brien version with 
respect to the narrow tailoring component by no longer requiring 
that a regulation be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the 
state’s interest.118  However, the Court emphasized that this standard 
still does not permit such regulations to infringe upon substantially 
more speech than is necessary to advance the government’s justifiable 
interests.119  Thus, a governmental regulation is invalid if a substantial 
amount of the speech it burdens does not further the state’s 
legitimate goals.120 
Unlike the guideline in Rock Against Racism, the Court has found 
that bans on door-to-door solicitation are generally unconstitutional 
because a state’s interest in maintaining the cleanliness of streets121 or 
                                                 
 113. Id. at 786–87. 
 114. Id. at 796. 
 115. Id. at 802. 
 116. Id.  But cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58–59 (1994) (overturning a 
ban on lawn signs because the ban eliminated an entire form of communication).  
The Supreme Court has expressed its suspicion of regulations eliminating entire 
forms of communication.  Id. at 55–56. 
 117. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
 118. Id. at 798. 
 119. See id. at 799 (asserting that the government may not implement a restriction 
on expression unless the restriction substantially advances the stated goals). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162–65 (1939) (stating that the 
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preventing fraud122 can be more effectively furthered by means that 
intrude less on First Amendment rights than a prohibition on all 
solicitation.123  The Court in Schneider v. New Jersey124 struck down a law 
banning the distribution of literature in streets and other public 
venues by holding that an anti-littering statute could have addressed 
the substantive evil the state sought to eliminate without prohibiting 
any expressive activity.125  In sum, although intermediate scrutiny is 
not a highly demanding standard, the Court has used the standard to 
invalidate several laws regulating speech primarily because the laws 
were not sufficiently narrowly tailored, infringing upon substantially 
more speech than necessary to advance the government’s legitimate 
interests. 
C. A Survey of Teacher Speech Jurisprudence 
1. The Supreme Court’s teacher speech jurisprudence 
In addition to applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to content-
neutral speech regulations, the Supreme Court similarly employs an 
intermediate level of scrutiny when analyzing whether the First 
Amendment protects the speech of public employees, such as 
teachers.  Beginning over four decades ago with Pickering v. Board of 
Education,126 the Supreme Court has decided a long line of cases that 
analyze specific instances where teachers and other public employees 
have been fired based on speech that is allegedly inappropriate.  
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding teacher speech rights, 
however, has yet to provide a framework for analyzing out-of-school 
teacher speech via social media.  Generally, the Court has based its 
teacher speech jurisprudence on the concept that government 
employers have a dual obligation:  (1) to effectively operate 
institutions providing public services and (2) to operate in a manner 
respectful of First Amendment protections.127 
                                                 
interest in street cleanliness is an insufficient justification to abridge the freedom of 
speech in question). 
 122. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 638–39 
(1980) (finding that the ordinance in question insufficiently related to privacy 
interests by applying it to public streets). 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 637 (asserting that the village’s legitimate interest in preventing 
fraud could have been furthered through penal laws used to punish fraud directly). 
 124. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
 125. Id. at 162–65. 
 126. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 127. See id. at 568 (observing that courts have rejected the assertion that the state’s 
interest in running effective schools completely trumps the need to preserve certain 
aspects of teachers’ First Amendment rights). 
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In Pickering, a high school teacher wrote a letter to a local 
newspaper criticizing his employer school board.128  There, the 
Supreme Court first introduced the concept of balancing a public 
employee’s free speech rights against a school’s interest in 
maintaining efficient operations.129  The Court considered four main 
factors when balancing the free speech rights of a teacher against the 
responsibility of the government to function effectively:  the degree 
to which the speech (1) interfered with employee performance and 
operation, (2) created disharmony among co-workers, (3) undercut 
an immediate supervisor’s effort to maintain discipline over an 
employee, and (4) undermined the relationship of loyalty and trust 
required of confidential employees.130  When the above requirements 
are not met, the Court will conclude that the school’s interest in 
regulating a teacher’s ability to contribute to public discourse is not 
significantly greater than the school’s interest in regulating such 
contributions by a member of the general public, and thus the 
speech in question would be protected.131 
Fifteen years later, the Court in Connick v. Myers132 clarified what 
constitutes a matter of public concern and used Pickering to create a 
two-part test:  whether the speech is of public concern, and if so, what 
the effect of the speech is under the balancing factors of Pickering.133  
In Connick, the District Attorney of the Parish of Orleans terminated 
Myers, an assistant district attorney, for insubordination after Myers 
circulated a questionnaire regarding private internal matters at her 
place of employment.134  Upholding Myers’s termination, the Court 
reasoned that when an employee’s speech is not related to any matter 
of political, social, or societal concern, government employers should 
have broad authority in managing their employees without the 
                                                 
 128. Id. at 566. 
 129. See id. at 568 (explaining that “[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a 
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”). 
 130. See id. at 570–71 (finding that the teacher’s critical letter presented no 
problems regarding the ability of the employer to maintain either discipline by an 
immediate superior or harmony among co-workers, did not involve a relationship 
requiring loyalty and confidence, and did not disrupt the operation of the schools). 
 131. See id. at 572–73 (declaring a teacher’s dismissal by the school district 
unlawful as his “erroneous public statements,” while critical of his employer, neither 
impeded his proper performance of classroom duties, nor interfered with the 
regular operation of the school). 
 132. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 133. See id. at 146–48 (determining that a public employee’s speech is protected 
when he is speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public concern). 
 134. Id. at 141. 
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intrusion of the judiciary due to First Amendment challenges.135  
Hence, the Court elaborated upon the rule it established in Pickering 
by emphasizing that the determination of whether the First 
Amendment protects teacher speech turns first on whether the 
speech touches on a matter of public concern.136  The Court noted 
that the judiciary is not the appropriate venue to review the 
termination or punishment of a public employee when the 
termination or punishment was ordered in response to that 
employee’s speech concerning matters of personal interest and not 
those of public concern spoken as a citizen.137  Under a matter of 
public concern analysis, a court focuses its analysis on the content, 
form, and context of the expression.138  If the court finds that the 
employee spoke on a public subject, the court then applies the 
balancing factors from Pickering to examine the effect of the speech.139 
More recently, the Supreme Court applied the same line of 
reasoning to public employee speech in Garcetti v. Ceballos.140  The 
Court held that the First Amendment does not protect against 
employer disciplinary action statements made by public employees 
when the statements were made pursuant to employees’ duties as 
public employees and not in their role as regular citizens.141  
Nevertheless, statements by public employees not made pursuant to 
their official duties might be protected under the First Amendment 
because such statements are of the kind regularly made by citizens 
not employed by the government.142  Therefore, the Garcetti holding is 
arguably limited and applicable only to public employees’ speech 
made pursuant to their official responsibilities and not to any speech 
made otherwise.143  Additionally, the Court explicitly declined to 
decide whether the Garcetti holding extended to the teaching 
context.144  Although the Supreme Court has not been confronted 
                                                 
 135. Id. at 147–48. 
 136. See id. (differentiating those matters of public concern, for which speech 
should be protected, from private matters, for which the state may impose 
punishment). 
 137. See id. (proclaiming that the responsibility of a court does not include the 
handling of private work-related grievances). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 146; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 140. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 141. Id. at 423. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 424. 
 144. Id. at 425. 
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with a teacher speech case specifically concerning teacher speech via 
social media, lower courts have faced the issue. 
2. Lower court cases analyzing teacher speech via social media 
Lower courts have taken slightly different approaches in their 
analyses addressing teacher-student communication via social media 
but have generally employed the Supreme Court’s matters of public 
concern test.145  In Spanierman v. Hughes,146 a public school teacher 
challenged the termination of his employment that resulted from 
postings on his MySpace page, a social-networking website, which 
included various conversations with his students about their personal 
lives, naked pictures of men, and a poem he wrote in opposition to 
war.147  The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut held 
that the comments regarding students’ romantic lives were not a 
matter of public concern and thus were not protected by the First 
Amendment; however, the poem the teacher wrote qualified as a 
matter of public concern and thus was protected.148  The district court 
applied the following framework:  To succeed on a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, a plaintiff must make a showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff’s constitutionally 
protected speech was a “motivating factor” in bringing about the 
adverse employment decision or determination at issue.149  First, the 
court focused on whether the teacher spoke pursuant to his official 
responsibilities under Garcetti.150  The court held that the plaintiff 
teacher was not acting pursuant to his employment duties when using 
his MySpace account because he was not under any employment 
obligation to make statements that were not related to an educational 
subject.151  Because the Garcetti test was not applicable, the court 
applied the Connick matter of public concern test.152  The court 
clarified that the First Amendment generally protects expression that 
is related to any matter of political, social, or societal concern.153  
                                                 
 145. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 159–60 (1983) (outlining the “two classes 
of speech of public concern:  statements ‘of public import’ because of their content, 
form and context, and statements that, by virtue of their subject matter, are 
‘inherently of public concern’”). 
 146. 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 147. Id. at 289. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 308. 
 150. Id. at 309 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). 
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Thus, the court concluded that the comments on the teacher’s 
MySpace page were varied as to whether they were protected under 
the First Amendment.154 
In Snyder v. Millersville University,155 another district court applied 
the public concern test to determine whether a teacher’s comments 
and pictures on MySpace were protected by the First Amendment.156  
The teacher had invited her students to view her personal MySpace 
page, which contained a photograph of herself drinking alcohol and 
comments relating to difficulties that she was having with a fellow 
teacher.157  The court held that since the postings raised only issues of 
a personal nature, they did not relate to a matter of public concern 
and consequently were not protected speech.158 Since the postings 
were not protected, the teacher’s First Amendment rights were not 
violated when she was penalized for the postings.159 
Although the courts in Spanierman and Snyder ultimately held that 
the First Amendment did not protect the teacher speech in question, 
circumstances exist under which teacher speech via social media is 
conceivably protected.160  Thus, a court confronted with a First 
Amendment challenge of a regulation banning all teacher-student 
communication via electronic media would first need to determine 
whether the ban reaches speech that is protected by the First 
Amendment.161  If all of the speech being regulated is not protected, 
the government has the authority to impose any restrictions it may 
desire because the speech does not come within the purview of the 
First Amendment.162  If, however, the ban is found to extend to 
protected speech, then a court would analyze the ban under the 
applicable First Amendment doctrines.163  If the speech is protected, 
                                                 
 154. Id. at 310. 
 155. No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
 156. Id. at *14. 
 157. Id. at *6. 
 158. Id. at *16. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See infra notes 179–214 and accompanying text (discussing examples of 
protected and appropriate teacher speech via social media). 
 161. See FARBER, supra note 49, at 13–14 (maintaining that “the first step in 
analyzing any First Amendment” challenge is to determine whether the speech falls 
under an unprotected category of speech). 
 162. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 90, at 1321, 1596 (explaining that the categories 
of speech the Supreme Court has deemed unprotected, such as fighting words and 
obscenity, can be prohibited and punished freely by the government and that speech 
by public employees is not protected unless it regards a matter of public concern). 
 163. The most integrated and common First Amendment doctrine is content 
distinction, which determines the level of judicial scrutiny that will be applied to 
analyze a regulation.  FARBER, supra note 49, at 21.  There are also three doctrines 
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employers cannot unduly restrict those expressions of their 
employees. 
II. REGULATIONS BANNING TEACHER-STUDENT COMMUNICATION VIA 
ELECTRONIC MEDIA ARE FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THEY 
ARE OVERBROAD AND FAIL INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
First Amendment jurisprudence dictates that the right of free 
speech is not an absolute right protecting individuals from 
governmental intrusion.164  Depending on the regulation’s purpose—
that is, whether it is to regulate the content of an expression or 
simply the time, place, or manner of an expression irrespective of its 
content165—courts employ different levels of judicial scrutiny.166  An 
individual also can facially challenge a regulation under the First 
Amendment employing the overbreadth doctrine.167 
Although the requisite showing under the overbreadth doctrine is 
a heavy burden, situations exist where a regulation does more than 
eliminate the exact source of evil it seeks to remedy and thus can be 
deemed overbroad.168  A regulation banning all communication 
between teachers and students via electronic media reaches a 
substantial amount of expression that the First Amendment protects; 
the protected language that the broad ban reaches is not the evil that 
a teacher-student communication ban is meant to eliminate.169  By 
seeking to curtail inappropriate interactions between teachers and 
students in order to prevent incidents of child sexual abuse, 
regulations on all electronic communication have the effect of 
banning ample beneficial and appropriate communications, while 
failing to eliminate inappropriate contact between teachers and 
                                                 
that a speaker can invoke without having to demonstrate that his or her particular 
speech was protected:  prior restraints, overbreadth, and vagueness.  Id. at 45–46, 49. 
 164. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text (enumerating the categories of 
speech that the Supreme Court has deemed unprotected under the First 
Amendment). 
 165. See supra notes 91–103 and accompanying text (discussing the content-
neutral and content-based distinction and the applicable standards of scrutiny). 
 166. See Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883, 
886 (1991) (providing an overview of the standards of judicial scrutiny and the types 
of regulations to which each usually applies). 
 167. E.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); City of Houston v. 
Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
 168. See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (detailing Supreme Court overbreadth 
jurisprudence). 
 169. See infra notes 179–214 and accompanying text (examining examples of 
teacher-student communication via social media that are protected under the 
Court’s Pickering and Connick tests). 
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students.170  Therefore, it is unlikely that such regulations would pass 
constitutional muster under the overbreadth doctrine. 
Because a reviewing court would apply an intermediate standard of 
scrutiny to a content-neutral regulation of expression, such as a 
regulation banning all teacher-student communication via electronic 
media, most content-neutral regulations easily pass the not overly 
demanding standard.171  Nevertheless, circumstances exist in which 
regulations would fail intermediate scrutiny.172  For example, a 
regulation that serves a compelling governmental interest may fail 
intermediate scrutiny if the regulation does not effectively address 
this interest.  Protecting a child’s health and safety is a historically 
recognized compelling governmental interest and therefore satisfies 
the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny analysis.173  Even though 
the end—protecting children from sexual abuse—is a valid 
compelling interest, a regulation that does not effectively address this 
end and also prohibits a large amount of appropriate and arguably 
protected speech will not survive the narrow tailoring prong of 
intermediate scrutiny.174 
For a regulation on teacher-student communication to be valid, it 
must not prohibit entire modes of communication, and lawmakers 
must draw the regulation precisely to address the compelling 
governmental interest.175  Because regulations banning entire modes 
of communication burden substantially more speech than necessary 
and several less restrictive effective alternatives are available, the 
teacher-student electronic communication bans would most likely not 
                                                 
 170. See infra notes 249–51 and accompanying text (arguing that bans on teacher-
student communication via electronic media will not curtail child sex abuse by 
teachers). 
 171. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything:  Intermediate Scrutiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 785 (demonstrating that when 
applying intermediate scrutiny, courts usually favor the government and, as a 
consequence, substantial amounts of valuable speech are squelched). 
 172. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161–62 (1939) (invalidating a 
complete ban on hand-billing under intermediate scrutiny because the ban was not 
narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s interests). 
 173. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (recognizing the 
protection of children from sexual exploitation and abuse as a compelling state 
interest). 
 174. See, e.g., Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161–62; see also infra notes 245–58 and 
accompanying text (analyzing whether the bans further the state’s interest in 
protecting children from sexual abuse and consequently whether they are narrowly 
tailored). 
 175. See Galloway, supra note 166, at 933–39 (outlining the components of 
intermediate scrutiny and demonstrating how a content-neutral regulation can satisfy 
the standard). 
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withstand a facial constitutional challenge under either the 
overbreadth doctrine or intermediate scrutiny.176 
A. Bans on Teacher-Student Electronic Communication Are Facially 
Unconstitutional Under the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine 
State and school district bans on teacher-student communication 
via social-networking sites and other exclusive electronic methods of 
communication are substantially overbroad because they prohibit a 
vast body of appropriate, protected speech, while only curtailing, at 
most, a limited amount of inappropriate speech.  A law is 
unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially more speech 
than the First Amendment allows, and a person to whom the law can 
be permissibly applied can argue that it would be unconstitutional as 
applied to others.177  Substantial overbreadth can be demonstrated by 
a showing of a significant number of situations where a law prohibits 
not just its intended target, but encompasses constitutionally 
protected expressions as well.178 
There are a considerable number of situations in which bans on 
teacher-student electronic communication could be applied to 
prohibit constitutionally protected speech or, at the very least, 
beneficial and appropriate speech.  When a law is being challenged 
under the overbreadth doctrine, a court will first determine whether 
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected expression is 
within the gamut of the law.179  A court could also find overbreadth by 
determining that a regulation eliminates significantly more 
expression than the speech that is “the exact source of the evil it 
sought to remedy.”180  To establish whether a law reaches protected 
teacher speech, a court would initially determine whether any of the 
                                                 
 176. See discussion infra Part II.A–B (applying the overbreadth doctrine and 
intermediate scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the bans). 
 177. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963); supra Part I.B.1 (detailing 
the Supreme Court’s overbreadth jurisprudence). 
 178. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293–94 (2008) (beginning the 
overbreadth analysis by construing the statute to determine what the statute covered 
and how far it reached). 
 179. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) (quoting Vill. of 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)) 
(acknowledging that a court’s initial task is to determine the effects of enactment on 
constitutionally protected behaviors). 
 180. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 
(1984) (noting that because the ordinance banned signs that constituted visual 
clutter and blight, the ordinance did no more than eliminate the exact source of evil 
sought to be remedied). 
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speech that is prohibited relates to a matter of public concern.181  
Then, the court would apply the Pickering analysis.182 
There are a variety of purposes for which social media can 
generally be used, such as staying connected with friends and family, 
sharing pictures and information, marketing, and meeting new 
people.183  Additionally, social media can be used to share art and 
news stories and to comment upon other matters of public concern 
contemplated in Connick.184  There are certainly ample circumstances 
in which teacher speech via social media could be related to matters 
of political, social, or societal concern and consequently would satisfy 
the Connick analysis.185  A teacher commenting on public issues such 
as war, politics, topics regarding the school district, and day-to-day 
problems teenagers face presumably would be speaking on matters of 
public concern under Connick, and therefore the speech would be 
protected by the First Amendment.186 
After determining that the speech being banned relates to a matter 
of public concern, a court would next employ a Pickering analysis, 
balancing the speech rights of the individual against the 
responsibility of the government to function effectively.187  Under the 
Pickering analysis, the four main factors courts consider are whether 
the speech (1) interfered with employee performance and operation, 
(2) created disharmony among co-workers, (3) undercut an 
immediate supervisor’s discipline over an employee, and (4) 
destroyed the relationship of loyalty and trust required of 
                                                 
 181. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (acknowledging that it is 
inappropriate for a federal court to review the personnel decisions taken by an 
employer of a public employee who speaks as an employee on matters of personal 
interest). 
 182. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (describing the need 
to balance the competing interests of the public employee’s free speech rights with 
those of the public employer striving to promote efficient public services). 
 183. What Is Social Networking?, SOCIAL NETWORKING, http://www.whatissocial 
networking.com (last updated July 18, 2012). 
 184. See, e.g., Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 309–10 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(determining that under Connick, a poem posted on MySpace by a teacher was a 
matter of public concern because it constituted a political statement). 
 185. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (cautioning that a stronger showing of 
“disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships” is necessary 
for an employer to take action if the employee’s speech involves “matters of public 
concern”).  But see Rachel A. Miller, Comment, Teacher Facebook Speech:  Protected or 
Not?, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 637, 637 (describing the accounts of a teacher who 
resigned after posting that her students were “germbags” on Facebook and another 
teacher who was suspended after being tagged in a photo posted by another user that 
showed the teacher with a stripper at a bachelorette party). 
 186. Connick, 461 U.S. at 144–45. 
 187. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
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confidential employees.188  Further, speech determined to be on a 
matter of public concern may only lose its protected status under the 
First Amendment when actual disruption to the government’s 
function is demonstrated.189 
A large portion of teacher-student speech via social media, when 
balanced under Pickering, does not implicate any of the four factors 
and does not compromise the responsibility of the government to 
function effectively.  Teacher-student communication via electronic 
media can either be related to education or can regard matters 
completely unrelated to education.190  Teacher speech via social 
media does not generally implicate the Pickering factors;191 
additionally, inappropriate teacher speech via electronic media has 
seldom been found and can be remedied through employment 
termination on a case-by-case basis.192  Teacher speech via social 
media can occur both inside and outside the school context.193  But 
the bans seem to be concerned primarily with the use of electronic 
media outside the school context for purposes not pursuant to a 
teacher’s official duties.194  In such a context, the majority of teacher-
student communication via electronic media would not interfere with 
                                                 
 188. Id. at 570–71 & n.3. 
 189. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (cautioning that a substantial showing that the 
disruption and destruction of a workplace relationship will take place is necessary). 
 190. See Paul Forster, Teaching in a Democracy:  Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply to 
Teaching in Public Schools, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 687, 711 (2010) (advancing examples of 
electronic teacher speech ranging from speech for instructional purposes to speech 
on a social-media site expressed “for purely personal purposes”). 
 191. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–71 & n.3 (noting that teachers who voice their 
differing opinions of school operations are not per se detrimental to the interests of 
the school). 
 192. See Social Networking in Schools:  Educators Debate the Merits of Technology in 
Classrooms, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2011/03/27/social-networking-schools_n_840911.html (asserting that 
despite the fear created by sexual predators operating through social media, the risk 
is less than commonly believed). 
 193. See Tod Robberson, Even Teachers Have Free-Speech Rights, DALLASNEWS.COM 
(Aug. 29, 2011, 2:17 PM), http://dallasmorningviewsblog.dallasnews.com/archives/ 
2011/08/even-teachers-h.html (discussing a teacher’s suspension for posting a 
comment about same-sex marriage and explaining that if the teacher had posted the 
comment off the clock it would have had different legal implications than if the 
teacher had posted the comment during school). 
 194. This is clear from the stated purpose of these regulations and the statements 
made by advocates of the regulations, particularly Senator Cunningham’s comments 
explaining that the focus of the Missouri law was only on teacher speech outside the 
school context.  Joshua Rhett Miller, New Missouri Law Bans ‘Exclusive’ Online Contact 
Between Teachers, Students, FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
us/2011/08/02/new-missouri-law-bans-exclusive-online-contact-between-teachers-
students.  Yet the bans do not specifically distinguish social media used inside or 
outside of school or for what particular purpose it is being employed.  Id. 
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employee performance and operation, would not create disharmony 
among co-workers, would not undercut an immediate supervisor’s 
discipline over an employee, and would not affect the relationship of 
loyalty and trust required of teachers.195 
Unlike the speech addressed in Connick, which was found to have 
created disharmony among co-workers and undermined the 
employer’s authority,196 teacher-student speech via social media would 
rarely, if ever, be related to the quality of the teacher’s work 
environment or issues with the management or employer;197 thus, it 
would not implicate the second and third Pickering factors.198  Also, 
the speech that is being banned—speech that is between teachers 
and students—is not directed at employers or co-workers.199  Further, 
the speech prohibited by these bans would not infringe on the 
relationship of loyalty and trust required of teachers because, as 
explained in Pickering, teachers are not in a position of public 
employment in which the need for confidentiality is notable due to 
the nature of the information accessible to them through their 
employment.200  Even so, the banned speech is typically on 
educational topics and not about confidential employment 
information.201  Teachers play a critical role in the development of 
their students; this role comes with certain obligations, such as setting 
positive examples, ensuring students receive the life skills they need 
                                                 
 195. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–71 & n.3 (extrapolating the factors the Court 
uses to balance the free speech rights of a teacher with the state’s interest in 
maintaining efficient functioning). 
 196. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151–52 (1983). 
 197. See Emily H. Fulmer, iBrief, Privacy Expectations and Protections for Teachers in 
the Internet Age, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14, ¶ 64 (asserting that teachers who 
communicate with their students via social media do not inherently harm those 
students).  But see id. (advancing that many teachers comment on their social-media 
profiles about their students and workplaces). 
 198. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 (describing the second and third relevant factors 
in balancing the free speech rights of a teacher with the responsibility of the 
government to function effectively). 
 199. Cf. id. at 569–70 (holding that there was no question of maintaining either 
discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among co-workers under the 
circumstances because the statements that the teacher made were in no way directed 
toward any supervisor or co-worker that the teacher came in contact with in the 
course of his daily work). 
 200. Cf. id. at 570 n.3 (finding that the teacher who wrote the letter criticizing his 
employer did not have the kind of relationship with his employer for which personal 
loyalty and confidence are necessary to their effective functioning and that his 
position as a teacher was not a position in public employment for which the need for 
confidentiality is significant). 
 201. See Social Networking in Schools, supra note 192 (addressing a study in which a 
teacher initiated a social-media pilot program in her school that positively affected 
students’ grades and improved rates of absenteeism). 
DI MARZO.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2012  12:56 PM 
2012] WHY CAN’T WE BE FRIENDS? 153 
 
for the future, and being accessible to students in order to assist them 
through any struggles that they may encounter.202  Bans on teacher-
student communication via social media significantly hinder teachers 
in their ability to cultivate a trusting environment because students 
and teachers heavily rely on such media to communicate about issues 
that students only feel comfortable confiding to their instructors.203  
Therefore, in the context of teacher-student communication via 
social media, the first Pickering factor—interference with employee 
performance and operation—is the most viable argument for 
banning such communications.204 
There are several contexts, however, in which teacher speech via 
social media would enhance, rather than interfere with, employee 
performance and operation and thus would not fail under the 
Pickering analysis.205  For example, teachers can utilize social media “to 
get to know their students better [and] to let students submit 
homework, share projects, and access calendars or a syllabus.” 206  Use 
of social media can serve as an “exoskeleton”—that is, educational 
support outside of the school context.207  Social media can also be 
                                                 
 202. See Michelle Blessing, Teachers’ Responsibilities to Students in the Classroom, 
EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/list_7623924_teachers-responsibilities-students- 
classroom.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (noting some roles for teachers in 
addition to the baseline responsibility to educate students); What Makes a Great 
Teacher?, GREAT SCHS., http://www.greatschools.org/improvement/quality-teaching/79-what-
makes-a-great-teacher.gs (last visited Oct. 1, 2012) (explaining that great teachers are 
accessible to students and are available when students need them). 
 203. Jacqueline Vickery, Missouri’s New “Facebook Law”—Protecting Kids By Policing 
Teachers?, (Aug. 10, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://www.jvickery.com/2011/08/missouris-
new-facebook-law-protecting.html; see Allison Blood, Interpretations Vary on New Online 
Communication Law, MISSOURINET (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.missourinet.com/ 
2011/08/04/interpretations-vary-on-new-online-communication-law-audio/ 
(asserting that social-media bans remove a valuable resource that permits teachers to 
connect with students through a means in which students feel comfortable); Josie 
Fraser, Teachers Must Engage with Social Media, OLIVER QUINLAN:  LIVE BLOGS (Apr. 16, 
2012), http://www.oliverquinlan.com/liveblogs/?p=576 (arguing that teachers need 
to understand where students are coming from to effectively help them). 
 204. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570.  Skeptics of social-media use by teachers fear that 
social media will distract teachers and students in the classroom; lead to non-
educational, inappropriate remarks; and negatively affect learning.  Trip Gabriel, 
Speaking Up In Class, Silently, Using Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/education/13social.html?pagewanted=all.  
However, high school and elementary school teachers actually employing such 
technology with their students have found the opposite results.  Id. 
 205. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571. 
 206. See Laila Weir, Kids Create—and Critique on—Social Networks, EDUTOPIA (May 
27, 2009), ht tp ://www.edutopia .org/dig i ta l -generat ion-youth-network -  
l i teracy  (asserting that social media also assists students with interacting with their 
parents on an educational level). 
 207. See id. (equating social media to an “exoskeleton” in that it “exists on the 
outside but supports the inside”). 
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used to create a classroom community and nurture a sense of 
belonging among students.208  Furthermore, teachers are mentors for 
many students and, at times, students will have issues that they only 
feel comfortable discussing with a teacher, such as parental abuse, 
bullying, or possibly thoughts of suicide.209  Often, children may be 
embarrassed or scared when approaching an adult with these issues; 
consequently, communicating via social media is the only mode of 
communication children might feel comfortable using because they 
can avoid a face-to-face conversation.210 
In contrast to the Missouri General Assembly, organizations, such 
as the National School Boards Association, and individuals in 
academia are advocating for greater use of social-networking media 
by teachers as an educational tool and a way to effectively 
communicate with students.211  These advocates recognize that 
technology is variable and constantly advancing and, as a result, 
students should be exposed to this technology in order to be 
adequately prepared for the future.212  Social media provides an 
                                                 
 208. Connecting Your Classroom with Facebook, NE. UNIV. EDTECH (Nov. 14, 2006), 
http://www.northeastern.edu/edtech/demonstrations_events/connecting_your_clas
sroom_facebook. 
 209. See Ramasastry, supra note 38 (addressing the policy and issues behind the 
Missouri law regarding teacher-student speech via social media); Vickery, supra note 
203 (acknowledging the social-media interaction between student and teacher as 
another outlet available to students in need of personal guidance). 
 210. See Vickery, supra note 203 (arguing that beneficial conversations should not 
be prohibited just because students may not feel comfortable having them in person 
with the teacher). 
 211. See NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, CREATING & CONNECTING:  RESEARCH AND 
GUIDELINES ON ONLINE SOCIAL—AND EDUCATIONAL—NETWORKING 7 (2007), available 
at http://socialnetworking.procon.org/sourcefiles/CreateandConnect.pdf (asserting 
that it is in a school district’s best interest to reexamine their social-media policy to 
allow the use of these media because study findings indicate both school district 
officials and parents believe that social media provides positive opportunities in 
education and plays a beneficial role in students’ lives); Rich L. Kaye, Social Network 
Technology in the Classroom, EZINE ARTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?Social-Network-
Technology-in-the-Classroom&id=1087558 (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (suggesting 
that teachers should be encouraged to utilize social media because of the speed at 
which technology is evolving); Social Networking in the Classroom:  Ideas for Social 
Networking with Students, EDUC. TECH. NETWORK, http://www.edtechnetwork.com/ 
social_networking.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (finding that because social 
media is used daily by students, teachers should take advantage of the opportunity by 
using these resources as part of their curriculum and using social media to enhance 
student-teacher communication). 
 212. See Steve Olenski, Should Teachers and Students Be Allowed To Communicate via 
Social Media?  Follow Up, SOC. MEDIA TODAY (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://socialmediatoday.com/steve-olenski/385170/should-teachers-and-students-
be-allowed-communicate-social-media-follow (asserting that students who interact 
using social media and technology are prepared for the future as well as for career 
paths that have yet to be identified); Fran Smith, How To Use Social-Networking 
Technology for Learning, Edutopia (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.edutopia.org/social-
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excellent educational tool for teachers and a method to reach out to 
less sociable students to get them involved and excited about 
learning.213  Moreover, teachers can use these sites to provide critical 
support to students who are at-risk.214 
Because a substantial amount of teacher speech in the context of 
teacher-student electronic communication can be classified as 
protected under a Pickering analysis, it is apparent that regulations 
banning teacher-student communications via electronic media are 
not narrowly tailored and thus are significantly overbroad.215  The 
laws plainly prohibit teachers from using any electronic media, such 
as Blackboard, Facebook, and Gmail, because these media have 
functions that allow teachers to communicate with a student 
exclusively.216  These regulations completely ban a form of 
communication between educators and students—a form of 
communication that encompasses several different media platforms 
                                                 
networking-how-to (reporting the views of Chris Lehmann, principal of a 
Philadelphia school, regarding the beneficial uses of social media by educators, such 
as a method of teaching students how to effectively interact and collaborate with 
others and how to become informed and cultured citizens). 
 213. See NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 211, at 9 (“Some schools and educators 
are experimenting successfully with chat rooms, instant messaging, blogs, wikis and 
more for after-school homework help, review sessions and collaborative projects, for 
example.  These activities appeal to students—even students who are reluctant to 
participate in the classroom.”); Preston, supra note 26 (intimating that educators are 
concerned that restrictive social-media policies will eliminate an effective tool for 
engaging students because students are regularly using social media to 
communicate); Curtis Clifford Cain, Social Networking Teaching Tools:  A Computer 
Supported Collaborative Interactive Learning Environment for K–12 (Aug. 9, 2010) 
(unpublished M.S. thesis, Auburn University), available at http://etd.auburn.edu/ 
etd/bitstream/handle/10415/2190/Cain.Thesis.Final.pdf?sequence=2 (concluding 
that using social media in school lectures facilitates collaboration between students 
in K–12 and creates a more engaging and thought-provoking learning experience); 
Alicia Russell, Social Networking Tools Highlighted at Teaching with Technology Day:  
Knowledge Sharing and Creation, NE. UNIV. EDTECH (Mar. 2007), http://www.north 
eastern.edu/edtech/about/columns/social_networking_tools_highli (highlighting 
various examples of social media that teachers effectively employ to engage their 
students in the classroom and promote collaboration). 
 214. See Ramasastry, supra note 38 (arguing that social-networking bans can 
possibly harm “students who face a crisis, need a role model, or simply want to talk to 
a teacher”). 
 215. But see Forster, supra note 190, at 711–13 (contending that Pickering provides 
limited protection to teacher speech via social media because even though the 
speech in question may involve nonschool matters, Pickering only protects speech 
involving a matter of public concern—a requirement that most teacher speech does 
not meet). 
 216. Rob Arcamona, Facebook, Students and Teachers:  A Question of Free Speech, 
KQED, http://mindshift.kqed.org/2011/09/facebook-students-and-teachers-a- 
question-of-free-speech (last visited Oct. 11, 2012); see supra Part I.A (discussing 
current state legislation and school district policies banning teacher-student 
communication via social media). 
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and stifles an ample amount of protected speech.217  As the Missouri 
court found, social media is generally the principal means of 
communication between teachers and students.218  By banning this 
entire mode of communication, the laws are stifling the potential 
benefits of technology to students. 
While in Ferber, the statute prohibiting child pornography could 
have only potentially overreached to appropriate speech in an 
insignificant number of instances, teacher-student communication 
bans regulate speech that is primarily appropriate.219  In Taxpayers for 
Vincent, the appellees did not demonstrate a realistic danger that the 
ordinance compromised individuals’ First Amendment protections or 
that a majority of the prohibited signs did not create safety or traffic 
problems that the ordinance sought to eliminate.220  Unlike the 
circumstances in Taxpayers for Vincent, regulations like the Missouri 
ban present a verifiable danger to individuals’ free speech rights and 
apply to many communications that do not relate to the evil the state 
is attempting to eliminate.221  Here, the substantive evil—child sexual 
abuse—is not created by the medium of expression itself, but is 
merely a possible by-product of the activity.222  Further, because the 
vast majority of the speech that the regulations ban does not trigger 
the state’s interest in protecting students from sexual abuse, the 
                                                 
 217. Mo. State Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 4425537 
(Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011); see Chad Garrison, Missouri Teachers Sue State over 
Facebook Ban, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011, 4:13 PM), http://blogs.riverfront 
times.com/dailyrft/2011/08/missouri_teachers_sue_state_over_social_med
ia_law.php (quoting Todd Fuller, a spokesman for the Missouri State Teachers 
Association, who stated that the Missouri ban completely inhibits a teacher’s ability to 
communicate with students and parents); Ramasastry, supra note 38 (summarizing 
the Missouri court’s ruling that found the social-media ban implicated teachers’ free 
speech rights because it completely banned a form of communication). 
 218. Mo. State Teachers Ass’n, 2011 WL 4425537; Ramasastry, supra note 38. 
 219. Compare New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (giving examples of the 
protected forms of expression that could fall within the purview of the statute, such 
as medical textbooks and pictorials in National Geographic), with Social Networking in 
Schools, supra note 192 (reporting that the benefits of teachers using social media far 
outweigh the costs and quoting Amanda Lenhart with the Pew Research Center’s 
Internet and American Life Project who explained that, generally, online child 
sexual predation is less of a risk than it is made out to be). 
 220. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 802 
(1984). 
 221. See supra notes 179–214 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
social-media use by teachers that do not contribute to the threat of child sexual 
abuse). 
 222. Cf. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808–10 (distinguishing Schneider’s 
overbroad ban on all hand-billing that attempted to curtail littering, a by-product of 
the expression, from the ordinance in this case that banned postings on public 
property to eliminate visual blight, which was itself created directly by the postings). 
DI MARZO.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2012  12:56 PM 
2012] WHY CAN’T WE BE FRIENDS? 157 
 
resulting overbreadth is so significant that it would not be curable 
through a case-by-case analysis of the fact situations in which the 
regulations arguably may not be applied.223  In essence, because the 
inverse of the reasoning in Broadrick is logical in this context, the rare 
instances where teacher speech via social media is inappropriate 
should be remedied through a case-by-case approach.224 
A law banning teacher-student communication via electronic 
media is analogous to the ordinance in Hill, which made it unlawful 
to interrupt police officers in the performance of their duties.225  The 
Hill ordinance had the effect of making only speech, particularly 
protected speech, unlawful because the State Penal Code already 
expressly prohibited the targeted conduct, such as assaulting police 
officers.226  A law banning student-teacher communication via 
electronic media, like the Hill ordinance, is an effort to eliminate 
inappropriate conduct, such as the abuse suffered by Amy Hestir, that 
is also already illegal.227  Sexual harassment of students by their 
teachers, to which the Office of Civil Rights has given an expansive 
definition, is prohibited by Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972,228 just as assault was criminally prohibited by the State Penal 
                                                 
 223. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773–74 (determining that because the statute only 
theoretically could overreach to protected material, any overbreadth that could have 
existed should have been “cured through [a] case-by-case analysis” of the 
circumstances (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615–16 (1973))). 
 224. Cf. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615–16 (directing that because the statute did not 
infringe upon a substantial amount of protected expressive conduct, any overbreadth 
that resulted should have been remedied through a case-by-case analysis of the 
circumstances in which the statute allegedly was unconstitutionally being applied). 
 225. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 451 (1987); supra notes 76–81 and 
accompanying text. 
 226. Hill, 482 U.S. at 460. 
 227. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 566.095 (2011) (“A person commits the crime of 
sexual misconduct in the third degree if he solicits or requests another person to 
engage in sexual conduct under circumstances in which he knows that his requests 
or solicitation is likely to cause affront or alarm.”). 
 228. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex, 
including sexual harassment, in private and public education programs and activities 
receiving federal financial assistance).  Sexual harassment of students is a form of 
discrimination prohibited by Title IX.  OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT:  IT’S NOT ACADEMIC 1 (2008), available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrshpam.pdf. 
The U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the federal 
agency responsible for enforcing Title IX, has interpreted Title IX as a protection of 
students from sexual harassment by school employees, other students, or third 
parties.  Id.  OCR has delineated examples of conduct that constitute sexual 
harassment such as “making sexual propositions or pressuring students for sexual 
favors; . . . displaying or distributing sexually explicit drawings, pictures, or written 
materials; . . . [and] circulating or showing e-mails or Web sites of a sexual nature.”  
Id. at 3–4.  Additionally, sexual harassment “occurs when a teacher . . . creates a 
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Code in Hill.229  Also, the remainder of the speech banned by these 
regulations does not relate to the state’s interest of curtailing child 
sexual abuse, just as the remainder of the speech banned by the Hill 
ordinance did not relate to the state’s interest of curtailing disorderly 
conduct and unprotected, obscene language.230  Therefore, bans 
prohibiting teacher-student communication via electronic media 
have the effect of only prohibiting appropriate and permissible 
speech because the speech and conduct sought to be eliminated is 
already deemed criminal by statute. 
The expansive nature of social-media bans is blatantly overinclusive 
in the content restricted.  In sum, the bans are overbroad because 
they prohibit (1) protected expressions, (2) communications by 
teachers with a large group of individuals that utilizes these types of 
sites, and (3) vast amounts of expression that do not contribute to the 
evil sought to be remedied.  Nevertheless, succeeding on an 
overbreadth challenge has proven to be difficult and rare.231 
B. Bans on Teacher-Student Electronic Communication Will Also Fail a 
Facial Challenge Under Intermediate Scrutiny 
Even if an overbreadth challenge to laws banning teacher-student 
communication via electronic media fails, a facial challenge to these 
laws under the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny is still available 
and achievable.  State and school district bans are not likely to pass 
constitutional muster when facially challenged under a traditional 
First Amendment intermediate scrutiny standard.  The bans are not 
narrowly tailored because they do not effectively further the state’s 
legitimate interest and burden a large amount of permissible speech, 
while also prohibiting all modes of communication via the Internet.232  
First, intermediate scrutiny is the applicable standard because the 
bans are content-neutral regulations of speech.233  Regulations 
                                                 
hostile environment that is sufficiently serious to deny or limit a student’s ability to 
participate in or benefit from the school’s program.”  Id. at 6. 
 229. Hill, 482 U.S. at 460–63. 
 230. See id. at 462 (describing the ordinance as sweeping and “not limited to 
fighting words nor even to obscene or opprobrious language”). 
 231. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (admitting the difficulty of 
succeeding on an overbreadth challenge of a regulation of speech). 
 232. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (explaining that a 
narrowly tailored regulation must “serve the government’s legitimate, content-
neutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means 
of doing so”). 
 233. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (describing content-neutral 
regulations as those that do not regulate subject matter and providing the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence that applies intermediate scrutiny to such regulations).  But see 
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banning teacher-student communication via social media prohibit 
entire modes of communication regardless of the content of the 
speech involved.234  The bans seek to regulate a manner of speech, 
rather than a specific subject matter or message conveyed by the 
speech.235  Thus, by qualifying as content neutral, the bans are subject 
to intermediate scrutiny when courts review them.236 
In Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court delineated the test for 
intermediate scrutiny.237  Bans on teacher-student communication via 
electronic media will fail under intermediate scrutiny because they do 
not satisfy the second and third prongs under Rock Against Racism.238  
The bans are not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest in 
protecting children from sexual abuse because they do not prevent 
sexual abuse from occurring and are substantially broader than 
necessary to achieve the interest.239  The bans also eliminate all modes 
of electronic communication, which precludes essentially all 
                                                 
Michelen, supra note 38 (applying strict scrutiny to analyze social-media bans by 
reasoning that laws that limit speech are usually subject to strict scrutiny); Jay Rivera, 
New Student-Teacher Facebook Ban Raises Constitutional Concerns, LEGALMATCH L. BLOG 
(Aug. 12, 2011), http://lawblog.legalmatch.com/2011/08/12/student-teacher-
facebook-ban-raises-constitutional-concerns-2 (examining social-media bans under a 
strict scrutiny standard by reasoning that the freedom of speech is a fundamental 
right and laws regulating fundamental rights must pass strict scrutiny). 
 234. Mo. State Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 4425537 
(Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011); see also Michelen, supra note 38 (quoting Senator 
Cunningham stating that she supports the Missouri law because exclusive 
communication leads to sexual misconduct). 
 235. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (guidelines mandating the use of city-
provided sound equipment and technicians were content neutral); Members of the 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (ban on the posting 
of signs on public property was content neutral). 
 236. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (explaining that the government may 
impose “reasonable restrictions” as long as the restrictions are content neutral, 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open enough 
alternative channels for the communication of the information); United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[G]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified 
. . . if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”). 
 237. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).  To meet intermediate scrutiny, the regulation 
must:  (1) further a significant government interest; (2) be narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest; and (3) leave open ample alternative modes of communication.  Id. at 
792 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id.; see infra notes 245–58 and accompanying text (explaining that a complete 
ban of teacher-student electronic communication is an inefficient means of 
preventing child sexual abuse by teachers and that such a ban fails to pass 
intermediate scrutiny). 
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communication between teachers and students outside the 
classroom, leaving few, if any, alternative modes of communication.240 
States and school districts undeniably have a compelling interest in 
protecting children from sexual abuse and other physical and 
emotional harms.241  Child sexual abuse by teachers has existed for 
centuries,242 and although it is possible that social media could 
facilitate teachers in communicating with their students to establish 
inappropriate relationships, social media did not create the problem 
and has not necessarily increased the number of incidents.243  Even 
generally speaking, personally directed communications via 
electronic media between a child and another person that are of 
serious concern to the child and parents are rare.244 
The bans do not effectively further the state’s interest of protecting 
children from sexual abuse by their teachers and thus are not 
narrowly tailored.245  For the bans to survive intermediate scrutiny, 
they must further a significant government interest,246 and the means 
                                                 
 240. See Mo. State Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 4425537 
(Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011) (finding that often, if not always, social media is the sole 
method of teacher-student communication); see also Garrison, supra note 217 (stating 
that the Missouri ban completely eliminates a teacher’s ability to communicate with 
students and parents). 
 241. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) 
(“[S]afeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor [is] 
compelling . . . .”); see also Arcamona, supra note 216 (insisting that state legislators 
and public school officials have a high interest in protecting students from sexual 
assault, especially by state employees such as teachers). 
 242. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (demonstrating that child sexual 
abuse by teachers was prevalent long before social media existed). 
 243. Vickery, supra note 203 (asserting that social media is not the problem and 
that instead, criminal behavior is what causes child predation, and if a teacher has ill-
intentions, a law banning him or her from communicating with a student via social 
media will not prevent inappropriate communication with that student through 
other means or by violating the ban).  But see Ramasastry, supra note 38 (citing to the 
testimony of a police officer during the hearings on the Missouri law that revealed 
that there had been at least four cases in which teachers used text messaging and 
social media to have inappropriate sexual contact with students). 
 244. The National School Boards Association conducted a study regarding direct 
communications with children via social media and found: 
About one in 14 students (7 percent) say someone has asked them for 
information about their personal identity on a social networking site; 6 
percent of parents concur.  About one in 14 students (7 percent) say they’ve 
experienced self-defined cyberbullying; 5 percent of parents concur.  About 
one in 25 students (4 percent) say they’ve had conversations on social 
networking sites that made them uncomfortable; 3 percent of parents 
concur. 
NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 211, at 6. 
 245. Cf. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 529 (2001) (finding that the 
state demonstrated a substantial interest in preventing access to tobacco products by 
children and adopted an adequately narrow ban advancing that interest). 
 246. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
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used to accomplish that interest must serve the end goal being 
sought.247  Here, the complete banning of teacher-student 
communication via electronic media does not efficiently further the 
end being sought:  the prevention of child sexual abuse by teachers.248  
Moreover, the state’s interest in protecting children from sexual 
abuse is not furthered by the bans any more than the interest would 
be furthered in the absence of these bans.249  Teachers seeking 
inappropriate contact with students are still able to initiate such 
contact by speaking to students in person at school, calling students 
via the phone, or writing notes to students on paper.250  Furthermore, 
there has been no demonstration that social media or other websites 
are more prone to abuse than any other form of communication, but 
nevertheless, the laws treat these different forms of communication 
in radically different ways.251 
Paralleling the overbreadth argument, these laws also do not satisfy 
the narrow tailoring prong under Rock Against Racism because they 
are substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s 
interest.252  For a regulation to be narrowly tailored it must “target[] 
                                                 
 247. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). 
 248. Teachers have other means of contacting students and thus those with 
inappropriate intentions can find other ways to initiate communication.  Ramasastry, 
supra note 38. 
 249. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 799 (“The requirement of narrow 
tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government 
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’” (quoting 
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985))); see also Casey Chan, Missouri 
Has Banned Teachers from Being Facebook Friends with Students, GIZMODO (Aug. 1, 2011, 
11:15 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5826539/missouri-has-banned-teachers-from-being 
-facebook-friends-with-students (asserting that prohibiting teachers and students 
from communicating through Facebook could never stop teachers from 
inappropriately interacting with students when teachers still see their students in real 
life everyday); Michelen, supra note 38 (explaining that it is naïve to believe that a 
teacher will not violate these bans if the teacher is willing to engage in sexual 
misconduct in violation of criminal statutes); Vickery, supra note 203 (arguing that a 
ban on teacher-student communication via social media will not prevent teachers 
from inappropriately communicating with their students if the teachers so desire 
because teachers can communicate through different means, such as hand-written 
notes,  and can also communicate in violation of the ban). 
 250. See Ramasastry, supra note 38 (rationalizing that even though there have been 
cases in which teachers have used social media and text messaging to inappropriately 
contact students, banning these modes of communication will not prevent such 
misconduct because teachers who desire to have sexual communications with 
students can still do so by speaking to students at school, via phone, or by school-
approved e-mail). 
 251. See Muray, supra note 1 (discussing the radically different ways in which the 
bill handles private communication between teachers and students depending on 
the medium). 
 252. See supra Part II.A (analyzing the bans under the overbreadth doctrine and 
determining that the bans prohibit a substantial amount of protected and beneficial 
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and eliminate[] no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to 
remedy.”253  Unlike in Rock Against Racism, where the exact source of 
evil, the volume of performances, was the only target of the statute,254 
a ban on all teacher-student communication via electronic media 
does not only target the few inappropriate interactions, but instead 
eliminates all possible expression through the banned media.255  
Furthermore, applying the reasoning detailed in Free Speech 
Coalition,256 the child-protection rationale at the foundation of these 
bans does not apply to a majority of the expression banned by the 
regulations.257  In other words, the expression the bans target is 
mostly speech that does not contribute or even relate to child sexual 
abuse and that has no reason to be curtailed because it is either 
educational or beneficial to students.258 
Finally, regulations banning all communication via social media 
and electronic media fail the third prong of intermediate scrutiny 
because they do not allow for ample alternative modes of 
communication.  Unlike the regulation on the volume of 
performances in Rock Against Racism, which the Court found did not 
foreclose ample alternatives of communication because the guideline 
did not close down the forum,259 here the bans close down all 
electronic fora that allow for exclusive communication.260  Even 
though there may be alternative approved methods of 
communication provided by the school, such as e-mail, the bans 
preclude the vast majority of modes of communication between 
                                                 
speech, and thus the bans are not effectively furthering the state’s interest in 
protecting children from sexual abuse). 
 253. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988). 
 254. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 802. 
 255. See Lieb, supra note 39 (expressing the concern that bans prohibit the use of 
media regardless of whether the media is used in the classroom or outside the 
classroom). 
 256. See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text (summarizing the reasoning 
expounded in Free Speech Coalition). 
 257. The purpose of the bans is to protect children from inappropriate contact 
with their teachers; however, the bans prohibit a vast amount of appropriate and 
beneficial speech.  See supra notes 183–218 (arguing the positive value of social-
media use by teachers, including the opportunity to comment on public interest 
issues and common issues relevant to students). 
 258. See supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text (providing examples of the 
positive and beneficial uses of social media by teachers, such as providing a safe and 
comfortable space for students to discuss sensitive issues, providing extra assistance 
outside the classroom, getting reluctant students more involved in the material, and 
preparing students for the role social media will play in their adult lives). 
 259. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 802. 
 260. See Muray, supra note 1 (discussing how the Missouri ban could be extended 
to educational services like Blackboard, which has a private messaging feature built 
in). 
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teachers and students, especially when the banned modes are the 
most prevalent, if not the sole, methods of communication teachers 
employ today.261  Although bans on teacher-student communication 
via electronic media are likely to fail under either an overbreadth 
challenge or intermediate scrutiny, there are guidelines a state or 
school board can implement that would achieve the state’s interest in 
protecting children from sexual abuse without running afoul of the 
First Amendment. 
III. CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE GUIDELINES REGULATING 
INAPPROPRIATE TEACHER-STUDENT COMMUNICATION VIA ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA 
There are several guidelines a state or school district can 
implement in order to deter inappropriate interactions between 
teachers and students via social media without infringing upon 
teachers’ First Amendment rights.262  Constitutionally permissible 
guidelines for teacher-student communication via electronic media 
cannot proscribe complete modes of communication and must be 
drawn to address the compelling governmental interest of protecting 
students from sexual abuse more precisely.263  Although the First 
Amendment gives school districts tremendous leeway in disciplining 
educators for their speech both within and outside of school, 
educators still retain some protection under the First Amendment.264  
                                                 
 261. See, e.g., Mo. State Teachers Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 
4425537 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011) (enjoining the enforcement of a ban on 
teachers using Internet sites that “allow exclusive access with a current or former 
student” because the ban had a “chilling effect” on speech). 
 262. See, e.g., Hamilton County Schools Technology Acceptable Usage Agreement, 
HAMILTON CNTY. DEP’T OF EDUC., available at http://www.hcde.org/media/HCDE_ 
AUP_Employee_Student.pdf (recommending specific social-networking websites 
and requiring parental consent for teachers contacting students via text messages); 
St. Thomas Episcopal School Social Media Policy, ST. THOMAS EPISCOPAL SCH., available at 
http://www.stthomaskids.com/socialmedia.pdf (recognizing the importance of 
social media in “engaging, collaborating, learning, and sharing in the fast-moving 
world of the Internet” and setting forth guidelines to ensure that such social media is 
used responsibly).  See Meredith Hines-Dochterman, Cedar Rapids School Board 
Reviews Social Media Policy, GAZETTE (Sept. 12, 2011, 8:05 PM), http://thegazette.com 
/2011/09/12/cedar-rapids-school-board-reviews-social-media-policy, for an example 
of a proposed social-media regulation that also acknowledges teachers’ First 
Amendment rights and balances those rights against the school district’s right to 
regulate the speech of employees in certain circumstances. 
 263. See supra Part II.A–B (examining why the bans would violate the First 
Amendment and concluding that the main problem is that the bans are not narrowly 
tailored because they do not effectively further the state’s interest while also 
overreaching to volumes of protected and appropriate speech). 
 264. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145–47 (1983) (declaring that the only 
public employee expression that is protected by the First Amendment is speech that 
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Thus, states and school districts cannot impose strict bans that would 
infringe on the remaining free speech rights that teachers possess. 
Instead, schools should inform teachers about what conduct via 
social media is appropriate and what conduct might be construed as 
inappropriate and not tolerated.265  Additionally, guidelines should 
provide suggestions that will assist teachers in ensuring that they are 
utilizing social media in an acceptable manner.266  For example, 
teachers should be told to refrain from sharing information with 
students that would not be appropriate to share in the school 
environment.267  In general, teachers should refrain from sharing 
their private cell phone numbers, pictures, and e-mail addresses with 
students.268  Teachers must maintain a professional tone during all 
communications with students.269  It is wise for teachers to also involve 
their students’ parents by giving them access to the social-media 
websites used for classroom and educational activities.270  Moreover, 
teachers should be cognizant that the majority of the information 
they post via social media can be accessed by anyone.271  
Consequently, they need to monitor their accounts and manage their 
privacy settings to ensure no inappropriate content exists or is 
visible.272  The content on their sites should not include criticism of 
                                                 
regards a matter of public concern—all other employee speech is unprotected and 
thus can be prohibited and punished by the government). 
 265. See Hines-Dochterman, supra note 262 (noting that public employees need 
guidance in this developing area of law). 
 266. See Daniel Solove, Should Teachers Be Banned from Communicating with Students 
Online?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.concurring 
opinions.com/archives/2011/12/should-teachers-be-banned-from-communicating-
with-students-online.html (enumerating several considerations that school districts 
should acknowledge when formulating their social-media policies). 
 267. See Social Media in the Classroom:  The Digital Safety Debate (Pt. 3), SAFE KEEPING 
BLOG (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.ikeepsafe.org/educational-issues/social-media-in-
the-classroom-the-digital-safety-debate-part-3-of-3 (finding that teachers “over-share” 
information via social media and suggesting that teachers only engage in academic-
related conversations with students in order to avoid disciplinary actions). 
 268. See ONT. COLL. OF TEACHERS, PROFESSIONAL ADVISORY:  USE OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL MEDIA 6 (2011), available at http://www.oct.ca/ 
publications/PDF/Prof_Adv_Soc_Media_EN.pdf (discussing how to minimize risks 
associated with online communication by interacting with students appropriately). 
 269. Id. at 6; see Hines-Dochterman, supra note 262 (stating that employees are 
expected to maintain appropriate professional boundaries when communicating 
with students via social media). 
 270. ONT. COLL. OF TEACHERS, supra note 268, at 6; cf. Social Media in the Classroom, 
supra note 267 (urging teachers to get parental consent before using social media to 
communicate with students).  Students would still be able to privately contact 
teachers about personal problems through other media, such as e-mail. 
 271. ONT. COLL. OF TEACHERS, supra note 268, at 4; see Hines-Dochterman, supra 
note 262 (suggesting that teachers should set privacy settings at the highest level). 
 272. See ONT. COLL. OF TEACHERS, supra note 268, at 6 (discussing how to minimize 
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students or employers or other impulsive, heated, or inappropriate 
comments.273 
Further, in order to address the compelling governmental interest 
more precisely, school districts should set forth clear examples of 
inappropriate conduct and communication.274  Teachers should be 
specifically informed that such actions as sending graphic, sexual 
material to students, fraternizing with students and non-students, and 
engaging in behavior or making remarks of a sexual nature are 
inappropriate and can subject them to employment termination and 
criminal prosecution.275  By doing so, states and school districts will be 
targeting the exact problem they are attempting to eliminate, without 
prohibiting any appropriate or protected speech.276  As more and 
more children are communicating and getting their news and 
information via social media, regulations banning teacher-student 
electronic communication not only infringe upon teachers’ First 
Amendment rights but also upon students’ education.277  Guidelines 
informing teachers how to use social media effectively and how to 
conduct themselves appropriately will allow teachers to utilize 
electronic media in a manner that benefits students while curtailing 
inappropriate communication and not violating the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The controversy over the use of electronic media by teachers 
generally and in education is still unresolved and hotly debated 
throughout the nation.  It is undeniable that social media may expose 
                                                 
the risk of inappropriate teacher-student communication via electronic media); 
Nancy Solomon, Friendly Advice for Teachers:  Beware of Facebook, NPR (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/07/143264921/friendly-advice-for-teachers-beware-of-
facebook (citing to Florida’s Lake County Schools social-media guidelines). 
 273. ONT. COLL. OF TEACHERS, supra note 268, at 6; see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 146–47 (1983) (holding that criticism of the school was not a matter of public 
concern, and thus the employee could be terminated because her speech was not 
protected under the First Amendment); Solomon, supra note 272 (describing 
instances when teachers spoke negatively online about students and were suspended 
or fired as a result). 
 274. See Michelen, supra note 38 (explaining that there are other ways to limit the 
exposure to inappropriate communication between students and teachers, such as 
educating both about appropriate behavior in school and online). 
 275. ANDY MANN, CALHOUN INTERMEDIATE SCH. DISTRICT, BEST PRACTICES FOR 
GUIDING STAFF IN USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 4 (2010), available at http://socialmedia 
guidelines.pbworks.com/f/Social+Media+Best+Practices+IV+-+Andy+Mann.pdf. 
 276. See Ramasastry, supra note 38 (describing the purpose of the ban:  to protect 
school-aged children from sexual predators at school). 
 277. See supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text (illustrating the benefits of 
social media that would be curtailed if the ban were to be implemented). 
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students to inappropriate material and facilitate teacher predators in 
contacting students; however, social media is not the enemy and the 
educational benefits it provides far outweigh the risks.278  Indeed, Amy 
Hestir’s testimony demonstrated that child sexual abuse by teachers 
occurs even without the use of social media.279  Thus, targeting social 
media will not completely resolve the issue and arguably will not 
ameliorate it either.  As states and school districts continue to revisit 
and implement electronic and social-media policies, they must be 
careful not to draft regulations that would abridge teachers’ freedom 
of speech and thus run afoul of the First Amendment. 
Presently, there are robust arguments for a challenge of certain 
state and school district bans on teacher-student communication via 
electronic media as facially violative of the First Amendment of the 
Constitution under the overbreadth doctrine and under intermediate 
scrutiny.  The bans are overbroad due to their exceedingly sweeping 
scope and ineffective response to the state’s interest of protecting 
children from sexual abuse by their teachers.  Under intermediate 
scrutiny, these bans are unconstitutional because they do not 
effectively further the legitimate state’s interest in protecting children 
from sexual abuse and are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to that 
end.  Nevertheless, alternative effective guidelines are available—
guidelines that do not run afoul of the First Amendment while 
furthering the interest of protecting students from sexual abuse and 
allowing for the rich educational benefits that such media provide.  
In an electronic universe, where young people rely on electronic 
media to acquire information, become educated about certain topics, 
and contribute their ideas, banning teachers from tapping into such 
a powerful tool will only handicap the education and innovation of 
our youth. 
                                                 
 278. See Social Networking in Schools, supra note 192 (citing several studies on the use 
of social media by students and summarizing the benefits reported and the 
misconceptions about the risks involved with its use). 
 279. See Muray, supra note 1 (discussing the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act, 
which was named for a student-victim of an abusive sexual relationship with a teacher 
that did not originate online). 
